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Abstract
We examine the appropriability problem of an inventor who brings to the market a suc-
cessful innovation that can be legally copied. We study this problem in a dynamic model
in which imitators can ￿enter￿the market either by copying the invention at a cost or by
buying knowledge (a license) from the inventor. The ￿rst imitator to enter the market can
then resell his acquired knowledge to the remaining imitators. This dynamic interaction in
the licensing market dramatically a⁄ects the conventional wisdom on the need for intellectual
property rights. Our main result reveals that, in equilibrium, imitators delay their entry into
the market and thus the inventor retains monopoly rents for some time. Second, we show
that the innovator strictly prefers to o⁄er non-exclusive rather than exclusive licenses which
would forbid reselling by the imitators. Last, we prove that when the innovator faces a large
number of imitators, her equilibrium reward converges to monopoly pro￿ts.
JEL: L24, O31, O34, D23, C73.
Keywords: Delay, market for technology, intellectual property rights, licensing, ￿rst
license, second license, war of attrition, hazard rate.
INTRODUCTION
Cesaroni and Mariani (2001) show that in the chemical industry a large share of technologies
are both exploited in-house and simultaneously licensed-out to potential competitors.1 Cesaroni
(2001) describes more speci￿cally the case of Himont, a chemical ￿rm which developed a process
of production of polypropylene.2 Although Himont was using its new technology to sell in the
market, it was also active in licensing its process, called Spheripol. The market for licenses was
characterized by intense competition. Indeed, other ￿rms producing polypropylene with di⁄erent
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1processes of production were also o⁄ering licenses. Given such behavior, entry of new competi-
tors was unavoidable and Himont could at least reap revenues from also licensing aggressively.
Furthermore, Arora et. al. (2001) argue that such licensing agreements among established ￿rms
and potential competitors are common not only for chemicals but also for electronics, software
and business services.
In this paper, we build on these facts and show that such competition to provide licenses
has essential implications for the rewards of inventors and for the need for intellectual property
rights. The central premise in the economics of innovation is that, without intellectual property
rights, the rewards from innovative activities are vulnerable to ex-post expropriation by imi-
tators. Imitators immediately copy the innovation, dissipating the rents of inventors and thus
discouraging initial investments in research. This well-known appropriability problem was ￿rst
pointed out by Arrow (1962).
The purpose of this paper is to reexamine this ￿conventional wisdom￿in the presence of a
market for licenses, that we call market for technology.3 We preserve the essential features of
the appropriability problem by examining the following situation. We consider an environment
in which imitators can legally copy an innovation at a certain cost.4 Moreover, incentives to
copy are such that, imitators would receive, after paying the imitation cost, a strictly positive
equilibrium payo⁄ even if all of them decided to copy. Within the con￿nes of this problem, our
point of departure is to consider the dynamics of trading between innovators and imitators in the
market for technology. Licenses may be sold in two distinct situations. First, the innovator, under
the threat of pro￿table imitation, may sell knowledge (a license, henceforth) to the imitators.
If entry on the market cannot be prevented, the innovator can at least reap some licensing
payments. Second, since knowledge is a non-rival good, imitators who initially buy a license may
subsequently compete with the innovator by reselling licenses to the remaining imitators.
Before presenting our results, we make a clarifying observation. We implicitly assume that
the lack of intellectual property rights is not an obstacle for the parties to conclude mutually
bene￿cial licensing agreements to exchange knowledge services, designs, codes, etc. Even if the
inventor is not legally protected against imitation or reinvention, she can still choose to sell her
knowledge. It has been argued that the existence of asymmetric information can be an obstacle
to licensing in the absence of intellectual property rights. Indeed, the innovator needs to convince
the potential licensee of the value of her invention but is then exposed to expropriation.5 We,
however, consider a case in which the innovation is already on the market, success is publicly
observable, and thus asymmetries of information are minimal.
To capture the elements previously discussed and, in particular, the dynamics of trading in
the market for technology, we initially develop a model with one innovator and two imitators.
Our model has the following extensive form structure. Time is divided in an in￿nite sequence
3We use the term of Arora et. al. (2001). Technology refers to knowledge rooted in engineering but also drawn
from production experience.
4The cost of reverse engineering the commercialized product. Technologies, displayed in the market, usually
conceal some details. Software is an example. The source code that is necessary for imitation can be, most of the
time, kept secret. For an excellent discussion, see Gans and Stern (2002).
5See Anton and Yao (1994, 2002).
2of periods. The innovation is introduced in the market at period zero. In each period, imitators
can enter the market either by copying at a cost or by buying a license.6 Once an imitator enters
the product market, he also becomes a competitor of the inventor in the market for technology.
In other words, he will compete with the innovator by o⁄ering a license to the remaining entrant
as observed in the case of Himont.7
As a benchmark result, we establish that when the market for technology is missing both
imitators immediately enter the market by copying at period zero.8 Indeed, there is no bene￿t
from delaying entry since the imitation cost will remain ￿xed over time. By contrast, the main
result of this paper reveals that, in the presence of a market for technology, imitators will delay
their entry into the market. Thus, the inventor will appropriate monopoly rents for some time
even in the absence of intellectual property rights.
This result is due to the dynamics of the price of licenses. When a market for technology
exists, entry will take place by licensing. Before any imitator enters the market, the inventor
o⁄ers two licenses at a price equal to the imitation cost. Once an imitator enters the market by
buying what we call the ￿rst license, the price of the second license, the license that will be sold
to the remaining imitator, is determined competitively in the market for technology.
Consider, for instance, the outcome of what we call the no-delay licensing equilibrium. After
the ￿rst license is bought, the innovator and the ￿rst entrant immediately sell the second license
to the remaining imitator at a price equal to its marginal cost, zero.9 These price dynamics
ensure an equilibrium payo⁄ to the second entrant strictly higher than the equilibrium payo⁄ to
the ￿rst entrant. This gives rise to a war of attrition in which each imitator delays his entry on
the market with the hope that his rival will enter before him and decrease the price of the license.
Note that what drives this result is the existence, in equilibrium, of a pecuniary externality: After
the ￿rst imitator enters the market, the equilibrium price of the second license decreases to zero.
As imitators delay their entry, the innovator retains monopoly pro￿ts for some time. The
expected duration of the delay can be considerable. Consider for instance the extreme case in
which the imitation cost is close but smaller than the present value of equilibrium triopoly pro￿ts.
In such an environment, when the market for technology is missing, imitators immediately copy
and the innovator only appropriates the present value of triopoly pro￿ts. We show that, when
a market for technology exists, the expected duration of the delay converges to in￿nity and the
innovator receives a reward arbitrarily close to the present value of monopoly pro￿ts.
In the environment described until now, it is natural to wonder whether the inventor would
not prefer to o⁄er exclusive licenses forbidding resale by the ￿rst entrant. Our analysis uncovers
that the inventor strictly prefers to sell non-exclusive licenses. If exclusive licenses were o⁄ered
both imitators would immediately buy a license at period zero. Thus, the innovator would collect,
6￿Enter￿means use the innovation in the market. Licenses o⁄ers are take it or leave it o⁄ers.
7If imitators enter simultaneously, they obtain their corresponding payo⁄s and the game ends. The model also
allows an imitator who enters by copying to sell licenses. This assumption does not a⁄ect our results for the case
of two imitators and simpli￿es our calculations.
8By missing we mean a form of market incompleteness such that knowledge trades cannot be executed.
9Since knowledge is a durable good and we assume that transferring it implies no real cost, its marginal cost is
zero.
3in form of licensing fees, the imitation costs, but imitators would not delay their entry into the
market. The innovator would like to keep the license prices high for some time and then decrease
them to encourage delay. Imitators, however, anticipate that such a promise is not credible and
that the price of licenses will be the same over time. Non-exclusive licenses, on the other hand,
work as a commitment device for the innovator: by changing the structure of the market for
technology from monopoly to duopoly, they provide credibility to future reductions in license
prices.
Next, we show the existence of a key connection between the delay until the ￿rst imitator
enters the market (i.e. the delay to buy the ￿rst license) and the delay until the second license
is sold. Although the no-delay licensing equilibrium is the unique symmetric markov perfect
equilibrium, there can also exist other subgame perfect equilibria. All of these are characterized
by di⁄erent delays until the second license is sold.10 So, the ￿rst entrant retains, until the
second license is traded, duopoly pro￿ts in the market. Thus, if the delay in the market for
technology is not too long, imitators continue ￿playing￿ a war of attrition. Otherwise, the
game becomes a preemption game in which entry takes place quasi instantaneously. In this last
case, the appropriability problem emerges once again but for a di⁄erent rationale: Entry occurs
immediately when imitators expect that knowledge will be slowly di⁄used in the market for
technology.
Last, we extend our model to the case of a large number of potential imitators. We ￿nd
the striking result that the innovator￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ converges to monopoly pro￿ts. The
intuition, in one of the two cases we consider, is as follows. The unique symmetric markov perfect
equilibrium in the market for technology is such that after the ￿rst entry, the inventor and the
￿rst imitator propose licenses at a zero price, almost instantaneously, to all remaining imitators.
If the number of potential imitators is large enough, the pro￿ts of the ￿rst entrant will thus be
signi￿cantly reduced and can be insu¢ cient to cover the initial entry cost.11 All imitators would
thus shy away from initially entering the market, e⁄ectively granting the innovator monopoly
rents forever.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model. The benchmark
result when the market for technology is missing is shown in Section 2. In Section 3, we establish
our main result. In Section 4, we explore two themes: the choice of exclusive versus non-exclusive
licenses and the multiplicity of perfect equilibria. Section 5 extends our model to consider a large
number of imitators. Section 6 examines the related literature. Section 7 concludes by discussing
several issues raised by our paper and by proposing a di⁄erent perspective on the increasing
popularity of secrecy as a means to protect innovative rents.
1. THE MODEL
We consider an economy in which an inventor (￿she￿ ), denoted by s, has developed an
innovation that represents an improvement over the previous state of the art.12 The innovation
10Although in all of them the license is sold at a zero price.
11This follows since all of remaining imitators will ￿nd at least weakly pro￿table to enter.
12The innovation may be either a product improvement or a cost reducing process.
4is not protected by intellectual property rights.13 Two imitators, denoted by h 2 fi;jg, may
￿adopt￿the innovation by either: (i) Using a costly imitation technology (henceforth, copying);
or by (ii) Buying technical knowledge from the inventor (henceforth, licensing).
We ￿rst describe the product market (hereafter, market). Time is broken into a countable
in￿nite sequence of intervals, each called a period of real time length ￿ 2 R++.14 The innovation
is introduced to the market at the beginning of period zero. At that date, the imitators might
already be producing with an older technology or selling an older product.15 To simplify the
exposition, without loss of generality, the pro￿ts of the imitators who do not use the innovation
are normalized to zero.
Imitators can adopt the innovation either by copying, c, or by licensing, ‘. To clarify the
terminology that we will use throughout the paper, when an imitator adopts the innovation at
period t we will say that he enters the market. Besides, we will describe him as active in the
market from that period on. We assume that the innovator and each active imitator obtain the
same equilibrium pro￿t ￿ ow regardless of their mode of entry. We denote by ￿n the equilibrium
pro￿t ￿ ow when n ￿rms are active in the market.16 Moreover, we make the standard assumption
that ￿1 > 2￿2 > 3￿3 > 0.
We assume that all parties are risk neutral and maximize the sum of their discounted expected
payo⁄s (i.e., pro￿ts plus potential licensing payments). Let r > 0 be the (common) rate of time
preference and ￿ := exp(￿r￿) 2 (0;1) the discount factor between time periods. The pro￿ts of
a ￿rm during a period in which n ￿rms are active in the market is
R ￿
0 ￿ne￿rtdt = (1 ￿ ￿)￿n,
where ￿n :=
R 1
0 ￿ne￿rtdt = (￿n=r) is the present value of market pro￿ts when there are n active
￿rms.
Next, we provide an outline of the imitation technology and the market for technology. The
imitation technology can be described as follows. An imitator by spending, at any period t, an
amount of real resources ￿ 2 R++ obtains instantaneously a perfect version of the invention. We
interpret ￿, the imitation cost, as a one-time sunk cost that must be incurred to reverse engineer
the ￿ne details of the innovation. An alternative to copying is to enter the market by licensing.
The inventor, being the creator of the innovation, possesses the required (indivisible) knowledge
to transfer the innovation. If an imitator buys this piece of knowledge at period t, he will be
able to instantaneously obtain a perfect version of the innovation at zero cost.17
We make the following simplifying assumptions regarding licensing agreements. First, we
suppose that licenses are ￿xed-fee contracts.18 At those periods t, such that no imitator has
13The lack of intellectual property rights is formalized in Assumption 1 of section 2. This assumption postulates
that: (i) Copy is not legally forbidden; and that (ii) The present value of equilibrium pro￿ts when all imitators
copy the invention is higher than the imitation cost.
14In what follows we will refer to period (t + k)￿ directly as period t + k for all k 2 f0;1;::g.
15Our model is su¢ ciently general to encompass situations in which the innovation is either drastic or non-
drastic.
16These pro￿ts depend on market conditions, the type of competition and the features of the innovation. To
make our argument most general we specify equilibrium pro￿ts in reduced form.
17The zero cost assumption is a convenient normalization. Further, to simplify, we also assume that transferring
knowledge from the inventor to the imitators implies no real cost.
18In a previous version we showed that the results were unchanged when we allowed for two part tari⁄s and
linear demand.
5entered the market yet, we denote by pt
sh the price at which the inventor o⁄ers to sell a license
to imitator h 2 fi;jg. If the inventor o⁄ers no license to imitator h 2 fi;jg we denote that by
a price pt
sh = +1. Second, the licenses o⁄ered by the innovator can be either exclusive or non-
exclusive. If an imitator enters the market before his rival by signing a non-exclusive licensing
contract with the inventor, he can then resell the acquired knowledge to the other imitator in
subsequent periods. We also assume that if an imitator enters by copying, he also becomes a
competitor of the inventor in the market for technology.19 Speci￿cally, at each period t, in which
imitator i is active in the market and entered by copying or by purchasing a non-exclusive license
and imitator j has not entered the market yet, the innovator o⁄ers a license at a price pt
sj to
imitator j and imitator i o⁄ers a license at a price pt
ij.
Formally, relevant economic activity occurs within the framework of the following extensive
form game. At the beginning of each period in which no imitator has entered yet:
(i) The innovator announces, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, a pair of licensing contracts (i.e.,
a pair of prices pt
si and pt
sj and the exclusivity feature of the contract);
(ii) The imitators simultaneously decide whether to enter the market or not and, conditional
on entrance, how to enter: They choose either c or ‘.
The game continues in this manner as long as no imitator chooses to enter the market. If
at period t both imitators enter simultaneously, the game ends and all parties receive their
corresponding payo⁄s. However, if only one of them enters the market, say imitator i, the game
continues as follows. From the beginning of period t + 1 on:
(i) If imitator i enters by either copying or purchasing a non-exclusive license, he and the
innovator simultaneously announce prices for a single license: pt
ij and pt
sj respectively. Otherwise,
when imitator i enters the market by buying an exclusive-license, only the innovator o⁄ers a
license contract to imitator j; and
(ii) Imitator j decides whether to enter or not and, conditional on entrance, how to enter:
By either copying or buying a license from one of the sellers if it is feasible for imitator i to sell
a license (i.e., if imitator i entered the market by copying or by buying a non-exclusive license).
Until imitator j decides to enter the market, the innovator and imitator i receive their corre-
sponding market pro￿ts. The game continues as long as there is still at least one imitator who
has not entered the market yet.
Payo⁄s in this extensive form are calculated as follows. Suppose that the following outcome
occurs: Imitator i enters the market at period t and imitator j at period t + 1. Besides, both
imitators enter by buying a non-exclusive license from the innovator. The innovator￿ s payo⁄ at
period 0 is then
Vs = (1 ￿ ￿t)￿1 + ￿t ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿2 + pt
si
￿
+ ￿t+1
h
pt+1
sj + ￿3
i
(1)
19The results given here do not actually depend on this assumption. However it simpli￿es our calculations
substantially.
6Similarly, the present value of the payo⁄ for each imitator is
Vi = ￿t ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿2 ￿ pt
si
￿
+ ￿t+1￿3; Vj = ￿t+1(￿3 ￿ pt+1
sj ) (2)
Last, we assume that all parties observe the history up to the beginning of period t and that the
buyer(s) observed the price o⁄ers and the nature of the contract made by the seller(s), at the
beginning of period t in the market for technology. A history at the beginning of period t consists
of a sequence of license contracts proposed by the seller(s), a sequence of entry decisions chosen
by the imitators and a sequence of decisions of how to enter the market. We use subgame-perfect
equilibria (SPE) as our solution concept. That is, we require strategies to form a Nash equilibrium
following any feasible history. In certain sections of the paper, we restrict our attention to Markov
Perfect Equilibria (MPE). In MPE strategies are functions only of payo⁄-relevant histories,
determined in our model by the number of imitators who are active in the market at each time
period.
2. BENCHMARK: APPROPRIATION WITHOUT A MARKET FOR
TECHNOLOGY
We analyze, in this section, the SPE when the market for technology is missing. Thus,
imitators can only enter the market by copying. We establish that both imitators enter the
market without delay at the beginning of period zero. This result can be considered as the
foundation for the ￿conventional wisdom￿calling for intellectual property rights.
It is important to note that although we consider an economy without intellectual property
rights, the imitation cost ￿ works as an entry barrier determining a natural measure of protection
for the inventor.20 A value of ￿ such that ￿ > ￿2 is su¢ cient to completely protect the inventor
from imitation. Indeed, given that the imitation cost is strictly higher than the present value
of duopoly pro￿ts, no imitator copies in equilibrium. The innovator therefore retains monopoly
pro￿ts ￿1, even though intellectual property rights are not protected. The goal of this paper
is to study the dynamics of entry and appropriation with and without a market for technology.
Thus, to make our problem interesting, we impose the following assumption on imitation costs
through Sections 2-4.
Assumption 1: 0 < ￿ < ￿3
In an economy in which copying is legal, Assumption 1 ensures that it is pro￿table for both
imitators. Under assumption 1, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the market for technology is missing. Then
(i) there is a unique SPE in which both imitators copy immediately at period t = 0
(ii) the equilibrium payo⁄s for the innovator and the imitators are ￿3 and ￿3 ￿ ￿ respectively.
20Actually, one can interpret intellectual property protection as policy measures that augment the level of ￿.
7Proof. See the Appendix.
When the market for technology is missing both imitators enter the market immediately.
Indeed, there is no bene￿t from delaying entry since the entry cost will remain ￿xed throughout
their planning horizon at the value of the imitation cost, ￿. Furthermore, by delaying entry,
imitators lose pro￿ts during the time periods in which they do not use the innovation. Therefore,
if entry occurs, it will take place at period zero for sure. Assumption 1 assures that entry is
indeed pro￿table for both imitators.21
Proposition 1 summarizes the ￿conventional wisdom￿justifying the need for intellectual prop-
erty rights. In the absence of such protection, imitators enter immediately following a successful
innovation and compete away the rents of the initial inventor. Foreseeing the risk that their
reward, ￿3, might be insu¢ cient to cover their research costs, innovators might thus shy away
from initially investing in research. The purpose of this paper is to challenge this line of thought
and to show that delay can actually occur in equilibrium when a market for technology exists.
3. APPROPRIATION IN THE PRESENCE OF A MARKET FOR TECHNOLOGY
This section presents our main result when a market for technology exists: We show that, in
equilibrium, imitators will delay their entry into the market and thus the innovator will collect
monopoly pro￿ts for some time. We assume that the inventor is constrained to o⁄er non-exclusive
licensing contracts. Although this might initially appear to be a strong assumption, we show in
section 4 that the inventor will prefer to o⁄er such non-exclusive rather than exclusive licensing
agreements. To present the intuition of this seemingly paradoxical result we must ￿rst identify
the sources of rents for the inventor.
A. Copying and Licensing
Because we start studying the MPE of our game, in order to ultimately determine the equi-
librium entry times of the imitators, we need to analyze two di⁄erent types of subgames. First,
the subgame which starts at the beginning of period ￿ ￿ t+1 after any feasible history in which
a single imitator has entered at the beginning of period ￿ ￿ t. Second, the subgame which starts
at the beginning of period ￿ ￿ t after any feasible history in which entry has not occurred yet.22
For clarity and future reference, we call the ￿rst subgame, the competitive subgame and the
second one, the monopoly subgame.23
We ￿rst examine the competitive subgame. Speci￿cally, suppose that imitator i has entered
at the beginning of period t. Both the innovator and imitator i can, in subsequent periods, o⁄er
licensing contracts to imitator j.24 The SPE of this subgame will be characterized by prices p￿
sj
21Both obtain pro￿ts of ￿3 ￿ ￿ > 0.
22Notice that after a history in which the imitators simultaneously enter, the game e⁄ectively ends. At every
period the ￿rms just compete on the product market.
23Formally, we consider a partition which maps the set of all feasible histories of the game into a set of two
disjoint and exhaustive subsets of this set. The partition mapping that de￿nes the payo⁄relevant history is de￿ned
by the number of imitators who are active in market at each feasible history.
24Imitator i entered either by copying or by signing a non-exclusive license. In both cases he can compete on
the market for technology (i.e transfer knowledge to imitiator j for a fee).
8and p￿
ij of the licenses and by the choice of imitator j relative to the timing and mode of entry.
For presentation purposes, a complete characterization of pure strategy SPE of this subgame will
be performed in section 4. In this section, to emphasize our main ideas, we focus our attention on
the MPE of this subgame that we call the no-delay licensing Nash equilibrium.25 For simplicity,
we present here the equilibrium outcome that results when the precepts of the no-delay licensing
Nash equilibrium are followed.
De￿nition 1 In the no-delay licensing Nash equilibrium a license is sold to imitator j immedi-
ately at period t + 1 at a zero price.
In the no-delay licensing equilibrium, a license is immediately sold to the remaining imitator
at a price equal to its marginal cost. In the appendix, we present strategies that give rise to this
equilibrium outcome and show that they form a subgame perfect equilibrium of the competitive
subgame. Those strategies prescribe that both the innovator and imitator i propose licenses at
a zero price in every period. Imitator j then has no incentive to delay his entry since the license
is o⁄ered to him at its minimal price. Furthermore, for both sellers it is a best response to o⁄er
the license at a zero price given that his rival adopts the same strategy. We call the license that
is o⁄ered competitively after the ￿rst entry the second license.26
It is important to point out that the no-delay licensing equilibrium is not necessarily the
unique SPE of this subgame. Indeed there could exist other SPE in which both the innovator
and imitator i keep prices high for some periods of time and imitator j delays his entry to
bene￿t from a lower price in later periods. In section 4, we examine the implications that this
multiplicity of SPE has for our main results. We also prove the existence of a condition that
guarantees that the no-delay licensing equilibrium is the unique SPE of this subgame. However
these issues are not necessary to understand the intuition of the mechanism that we highlight
and so we discuss them in depth in section 4.
We now examine the expected payo⁄s of the imitators when the no-delay licensing equilibrium
is being played. Imitator j, the follower imitator (i.e., the imitator who enters second), will enter
at the beginning of period t + 1 by obtaining a license at a zero price. His expected equilibrium
payo⁄ in period t units is therefore
Vj = ￿￿3 (3)
The expected payo⁄ of imitator i depends on his mode of entry. If he entered the market by
copying, his expected payo⁄ in period t units would be
V c
i = (1 ￿ ￿)￿2 + ￿￿3 ￿ ￿
as: (i) He obtains a ￿ ow of duopoly pro￿ts during period t; and: (ii) Since the no-delay equilibrium
is played, the remaining imitator will immediately enter at period t+1 and therefore his pro￿ts
25The no-delay licensing equilibrium is the unique MPE.
26This types of competition was observed in the case of Himont mentionned in the introduction.
9decrease to triopoly pro￿ts ￿3 thereon.27 If he instead entered the market by licensing, his
expected payo⁄ in period t units would be28
V ‘
i = (1 ￿ ￿)￿2 + ￿￿3 ￿ psi
Observe that the only distinction between V c
i and V ‘
i resides in the entry cost. In particular,
neither by licensing nor by copying, does imitator i expects to obtain future licensing pro￿ts.
Price competition in the market for technology will reduce licensing pro￿ts to zero.
Therefore, to determine the mode of entry of imitators we need to examine the prices at which
the inventor o⁄ers to sell the licenses. We thus turn our attention to the monopoly subgame.
We establish that the inventor will always o⁄er two licenses at prices smaller or equal to the
imitation cost. Thus, the imitators will always enter the market by licensing rather than by
copying.
Lemma 1 In the monopoly subgame, the innovator o⁄ers two licenses at prices psi ￿ ￿ and
psj ￿ ￿. Thus, copying never occurs in a MPE.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. The innovator can always do weakly better by
adding a second license at a price equal to ￿ at every period than by o⁄ering only one license. By
adopting this licensing strategy, she does not change the entry costs and thus the entry decision
of the imitators (the previously excluded imitator could always enter by copying if he paid the
imitation cost ￿) but collects licensing revenues when the imitators do enter the market.29 Given
these license prices, imitators, if they enter the market, will always do so by purchasing a license
from the inventor and not by copying.
We still need to establish the exact license prices that the innovator will set. But ￿rst we
summarize the payo⁄s of the imitators. If the leader imitator (i.e., the one who enters ￿rst,
denoted by superscript 1), enters at period t, then, according to equation (3) and lemma 1, the
payo⁄s for the leader and the follower imitator in period t units are
V 1
h = (1 ￿ ￿)￿2 + ￿￿3 ￿ psh; V 2
h = ￿￿3 (4)
for h 2 fi;jg. On the other hand, if both imitators enter simultaneously their payo⁄s in period
t units are
V b
i = ￿3 ￿ psi;V b
j = ￿3 ￿ psj (5)
27Observe that if we assumed that imitator i could not become a seller were he copied the invention instead
of buying knowledge from the inventor, he would obtain the same expected payo⁄ in period t units. Indeed,
in equilibrium, at the beginning of period t + 1, the inventor would sell knowledge to imitator j and he would
immediately accept.
28Recall that in an MPE prices do not depend on calendar time but just on the number of imitators who are
active in the market.
29The same idea applies to show that it is preferable to o⁄er two licenses at a price of ￿ rather than no license
at all.
10A number of properties of these payo⁄s underlie our main results. First, we observe that as ￿
goes to one (or equivalently as ￿ shrinks to zero), the payo⁄ of the follower imitator is always
strictly higher than the payo⁄ of the leader imitator. This, formally, ensures a ￿war of attrition￿
between the imitators that yields delay to enter the market. Each imitator delays his entry time
into the market with the hope of buying the second license and thus to pay a zero price for
knowledge in the future. Second, we note that when the inventor raises the price of knowledge
ps she increases the di⁄erence between V 1 and V 2 and thus she magni￿es the incentives of the
imitators to wait longer before entering the market.
B. Appropriation in the absence of legal protection
Here we present our main result. We obtain the equilibrium license prices chosen by the
innovator and the equilibrium entry time of the imitators. For tractability, we present our
results for the limit of our discrete-timing game as the length of each period becomes arbitrarily
small. For that, we initially ￿x a ￿ > 0 and then we inspect the limiting behavior of markov
perfect equilibria when ￿ shrinks to zero. Characterizing the limiting case has one important
advantage: We are able to explicitly compute the innovator￿ s equilibrium expected payo⁄ and
to compare it with the payo⁄ that she obtains when the market for technology is missing.
Because the innovator will set license prices below or at most equal to the imitation cost, we
directly denote the behavior strategy for imitator h 2 fi;jg by  h(psi;psj) and we interpreted it
as the probability of buying a license at period t conditional on reaching period t. The innovator￿ s
strategy must specify at each period at which entry has not happened yet a pair of license prices
fpsi;psjg. These strategies are (part) of a MPE if: (i) For any pair of license prices chosen by
the innovator, the pair of behavior strategies selected by the imitators are, for each period, a
Nash equilibrium between the imitators; and (ii) Given the equilibrium behavior strategies of
the imitators, the innovator chooses a pair of license prices that maximizes her expected payo⁄.
We say that a MPE is symmetric if when psi = ps = psj, then  i(ps) =  j(ps).
As we observed before when the length of a period, ￿, shrinks to zero, the payo⁄ of the
follower imitator becomes strictly higher than the payo⁄ of the leader imitator. This gives rise
to a ￿war of attrition￿in which each imitator delays his time to enter the market with the hope
of buying the second license at a zero price. Meanwhile, the innovator, being the sole user of
the innovation in the market, appropriates temporal monopoly pro￿ts. Proposition 2, the main
result of this paper, formally captures this economic idea.
Proposition 2 As the length of each period, ￿, converges to zero, there exists a unique sym-
metric MPE such that
(i) the innovator sets prices psi = psj = ￿ for the licenses;
(ii) the distribution of entry times of each imitator converges to an exponential distribution with
hazard rate equal to
￿ =
r(￿3 ￿ ￿)
￿
11(iii) the inventor￿ s equilibrium expected payo⁄ is
Vs (￿) =
￿1
r + 2￿
+
2￿
r + 2￿
(￿3 + ￿)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Result (ii) of proposition 2 indicates that the limiting distribution of entry times is an expo-
nential distribution with hazard rate equal to ￿. This is a typical result in war of attrition games.
We examine next, in subsection C, the parameters that in￿ uence the size of this instantaneous
entry rate for each imitator and the magnitude of the innovator￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ given in
result (iii).
The equilibrium entry times of the imitators are used to derive result (i) which describes
the optimal pricing decision of the inventor. The inventor chooses psi and psj to maximize her
expected payo⁄. If the innovator sets the same price ps for both imitators, the hazard rate is
given by
￿(ps) =
r(￿3 ￿ ps)
ps
and the expected payo⁄ for the inventor can be expressed as
Vs(ps) =
￿1
r + 2￿
+
2￿
r + 2￿
(￿3 + ps)
In this synthetic form, we observe that the license price ps has several e⁄ects. First, and most
obvious, a higher price for knowledge raises the licensing revenues that the inventor collects
when she sells the ￿rst license (i.e. the license to the ￿rst imitator). Second, a higher price for
knowledge decreases the hazard rate ￿(ps) and thus delays entry into the market by the imitators.
Indeed, as ps increases, it becomes more attractive for the imitators to delay their entry times
with the hope of buying the second license at a zero price if the rival enters ￿rst. There is
nevertheless a countervailing e⁄ect: As imitators delay their entry times, the licensing pro￿ts are
obtained later, potentially decreasing the overall period-0 expected payo⁄of the inventor. Result
(i) demonstrates that this third e⁄ect is dominated by the previous ones. The inventor chooses
the license price that maximizes the delay in entry times (i.e., the license price that minimizes
the hazard rate). The incentive to preserve monopoly rents for a longer period clearly dominate
the potential loss in licensing revenues.
The essential message of proposition 2 is that, when a market for technology exists, the inven-
tor retains monopoly pro￿ts for a time period, even in complete absence of intellectual property
rights. The innovator bene￿ts in two ways from the existence of a market for technology. She
collects licensing revenues but, more importantly, the dynamics of the equilibrium license prices
in this market encourage imitators to delay their entry times and thus the inventor preserves
monopoly rents for a time period.
C. Sources of rents for the innovator
12Propositions 1 and 2 allow us to discuss the sources and the magnitude of the additional rents
obtained by the inventor in the presence of a market for technology. Proposition 1 demonstrates
that in the absence of a market for technology, imitators immediately copy and the inventor
obtains an equilibrium payo⁄of ￿3. Proposition 2, shows that the incremental payo⁄that accrues
to the inventor when a market for technology exists is
Vs(￿) ￿ ￿3 =
[￿1 ￿ ￿3]
(r + 2￿)
+
2￿
(r + 2￿)
￿ (6)
"
Rewards
from Delayed Entry
#
+
"
Licensing
Revenues
#
Equation (6) illustrates the fact that the innovator obtains both direct revenues from licensing
and indirect bene￿ts from delayed entry.
The length of time during which the innovator retains monopoly rents depends on the equilib-
rium hazard rate, ￿, that, in a symmetric equilibrium, has a compelling economic interpretation.
Observe that, if entry has not happened yet, the opportunity cost for each imitator of delaying
entry an in￿nitesimal amount of time equals r(￿3 ￿ ￿): the ￿ ow equilibrium payo⁄that he would
obtain if he were the leader imitator. But, on the other hand, the bene￿t for each imitator of
delaying entry an in￿nitesimal amount of time equals ￿: the di⁄erence in the equilibrium payo⁄s
between being the leader and the follower imitator. This bene￿t is only obtained if the rival
imitator enters ￿rst: An event that happens with hazard rate equal to ￿. Thus, in a behavior
symmetric equilibrium, ￿￿ = r(￿3 ￿ ￿), implying that ￿ = r(￿3 ￿ ￿)=￿.
So, the expected duration of the time period during which the innovator retains monopoly
rents30
1
2￿
=
(￿=2)
r(￿3 ￿ ￿)
(7)
depends not only on the bene￿t of waiting (i.e. the absolute value of ￿) but also on the op-
portunity cost of waiting (i.e. (￿3 ￿ ￿)). Fixing the values for r and ￿3, the key parameter of
our model is, ￿, the imitation cost. When ￿ goes to zero, the bene￿ts of waiting are completely
eliminated and the imitators enter the market immediately at time 0. When ￿ increases, the ex-
pected duration of ￿monopoly￿time and the overall rents of the innovator increase.31 Moreover,
note that when ￿ increases not only the bene￿ts of waiting increase but also the opportunity
costs of waiting decrease. As ￿ goes to ￿3 the opportunity cost of waiting goes to zero and, in
the limit, entry into the product market never happens. Thus, even in the absence of intellectual
property rights, the inventor obtains the present value of monopoly pro￿ts. We summarize the
preceding discussion in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Suppose that a market for technology exists. Then
(i) the expected duration of monopoly time and the inventor￿ s expected equilibrium payo⁄ are
30The formula belows follows immediately from the de￿nition of expectation for an exponential distribution
with parameter equal to 2￿ (i.e., there are two imitators).
31This statement can be easily con￿rmed by: (i) Totally di⁄erentiating Vs(￿) with respect to ￿; (ii) Considering
that d￿=d￿ = ￿
1
￿ [r + ￿] < 0; and ￿nally: (iii) Using assumption 1.
13strictly increasing in the imitation cost, ￿
(ii) the inventor￿ s expected equilibrium payo⁄ converges monotonically to the present value of
monopoly pro￿ts, ￿1, as ￿ converges to ￿3.
We ￿nish this discussion with an illustrative example
Example
Consider a product that generates monopoly pro￿ts of ￿1 = $0:1 million per year. Suppose
r = 10 percent. An innovator protected by an in￿nitely long patent will obtain discounted pro￿ts
of ￿1 = $1M: Suppose that market demand is well approximated by a linear demand and that
marginal cost is constant. If ￿rms compete on quantities, we can the derive the value of triopoly
pro￿ts: ￿3 = $0:025M and ￿3 = $0:25M: We then vary ￿ between 0 and ￿3.
We present the results in the following table. In the ￿rst column, we report the duration
of monopoly time (i.e., the expected delay in entry). In the second, we report the discounted
pro￿ts of the innovator derived from result (iii) in Proposition 2. In the last three columns, we
decompose the percentage contributions of the di⁄erent revenue streams: (i) Percentage coming
from monopoly pro￿ts before entry ( ￿1
r+2￿); (ii) Percentage coming from triopoly pro￿ts after
entry ( 2￿
r+2￿￿3); and: (iii) Percentage obtained from licensing revenues ( 2￿
r+2￿￿).
￿ ($M)
Dur. Mon.
Time (years)
Discounted
Pro￿ts
of innovator ($M)
% Before
Entry
% After
Entry
% Licensing
Revenues
0.01 0.21 0.275 7 89 4
0.02 0.43 0.3 14 80 6
0.04 0.95 0.35 25 65 10
0.07 1.94 0.43 38 49 14
0.1 3.33 0.51 49 37 15
0.2 20 0.82 82 10 8
0.24 120 0.96 96 2 2
0.249 1245 0.99 100 0 0
As ￿ increases the expected time of ￿rst entry and the expected equilibrium payo⁄ of the
innovator increase. If the cost of reverse engineering the process is $10000, the innovator expects
to retain monopoly pro￿ts for more than two months and overall to obtain pro￿ts of $275000
(compared to $250000 without licensing markets). However, if the cost of reverse engineering is
$100000 entry would be prevented on average for close to 3 years and a half and the innovator
would obtain pro￿ts of $510000, a bit more than half the present value of monopoly pro￿ts.32
32Note that, to the best of our knowledge, there is no good estimate of the cost of reverse engineering. Maurer
and Scotchmer (2002) argue nevertheless that in certain industries it is reasonable to assume that the cost of
an independent inventor is similar to the cost of the initial innovator. In our context this would imply that the
innovator could cerainly cover his invention cost.
14We observe, in accordance with Corollary 1, that the payo⁄ of the innovator converges to
monopoly as ￿ converges to ￿3. It is interesting to discuss the e⁄ects reported in last three
columns. The percentage of the overall equilibrium payo⁄ coming from the monopoly position
before entry naturally increases with ￿. Conversely the percentage of the overall equilibrium
payo⁄ coming from triopoly pro￿ts after entry decreases with the imitation cost. The more
interesting result relates to licensing revenues. We notice that, as ￿ increases, the percentage
of revenue coming from licensing initially increases and then decreases. Indeed, as ￿ increases,
the instantaneous licensing revenues increase. This e⁄ect is linear in ￿. However, as ￿ increases,
these revenues are obtained at a later date. Given that the e⁄ect of ￿ on delay is non linear, the
second e⁄ect dominates as ￿ goes to ￿3. Therefore, the discounted value of expected licensing
revenues initially increases with ￿ and then decreases as the e⁄ect of the delay starts dominating.
4. EXCLUSIVITY, DELAY AND APPROPRIATION: FURTHER RESULTS
Section 3 introduced our main result. However, to keep the exposition simple, we concentrated
on non-exclusive contracts and focused on one particular equilibrium in the competitive subgame.
In this section we examine these issues more thoroughly. First, we study the case of exclusive
contracts and show that the innovator will not use them in equilibrium. We then characterize the
full set of symmetric perfect equilibrium and identify a condition under which the equilibrium
studied in section 3 is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
A. Exclusive contracts
In the previous section we constrained the innovator to o⁄er non-exclusive licenses. This
might appear overly restrictive. Certainly, exclusive licenses might be attractive to the innovator
as they remove competition in the market for technology. Nevertheless, in this section, we
show that the innovator will choose to o⁄er non-exclusive licenses rather than exclusive licensing
contracts. We suppose in this sub-section (as opposed to sub-section B) that, if non-exclusive
licenses were sold, the no-delay licensing equilibrium would be played in the competitive subgame.
We ￿rst examine the subgame that follows after the ￿rst imitator, say imitator i, enters the
market by signing an exclusive licensing agreement with the inventor. The innovator then has
to decide at every period at what price to o⁄er the license to the remaining imitator. We then
obtain the following intermediate result.
Lemma 2 The unique SPE of the subgame starting at t + 1 after entry at t of imitator i with
an exclusive license, is such that the innovator o⁄ers a licensing contract at a price ￿ at every
period and imitator j enters immediately at t + 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The innovator would ideally want to promise imitator j to lower the license price in the future
to delay his entry into the market. However, this promise is not credible as once that period
comes, the innovator has an incentive to keep prices high and it is optimal for the imitator to
15accept such high o⁄ers rather than spend the imitation cost. Therefore, the unique SPE is such
that imitator j enters immediately by paying a price of ￿ to the innovator. We now analyze the
SPE of the entire game.
Proposition 3 The unique SPE when the inventor o⁄ers exclusive licenses is such that
(i) both imitators enter immediately at period t = 0 by buying licenses for a price of ￿
(ii) the innovator￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ V e
s = ￿3 + 2￿, is strictly smaller than the equilibrium
payo⁄ that she obtains when she o⁄ers non-exclusive licenses.
Proof. See the Appendix.
It is interesting to compare the results of Propositions 1 and 3. In both cases, imitators
correctly perceive that their entry cost will remain ￿xed in the future and thus decide to enter
the market immediately at period zero. However, in the case of Proposition 3, the entry cost
remains constant over time due to the exclusivity clauses contained in the licensing contracts.
When using exclusive contracts, the innovator cannot commit to lower the price of the second
license in the future and, from the point of view of the imitators, she replicates the same economic
environment as if the market for technology were missing. The innovator, however, obtains higher
rents: She appropriates, in form of licensing revenues, what before were lost imitation costs.
Result (ii) compares the equilibrium payo⁄ for the innovator in the exclusive and non-
exclusive cases. The bene￿ts of o⁄ering exclusive contracts is that licensing revenues are higher
in absolute terms and are obtained earlier (at period 0). However, by o⁄ering exclusive contracts,
the innovator is unable to commit to lower the price of the second license. Non-exclusive con-
tracts allow the innovator to make this commitment by introducing competition on the market
for technology. The imitators therefore delay their entry into the product market. Result (ii)
shows that the extra monopoly pro￿ts collected due to this delay are larger than the lost licensing
revenues.
Some suggestive empirical evidence seems to con￿rm the importance of non-exclusive con-
tracts in the absence of patents or when patent rights are ￿weak￿ . Anand and Khanna (2000),
report the percentage of non-exclusive licenses signed in their sample of contracts.33 For chemicals
(mostly drugs in the sample), the percentage of non exclusive licenses is 12.36%, for computers
28.48% and for electronics 30.35%. This evidence can be confronted to the data collected in the
Carnegie Mellon Survey, reported by Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000), that asked managers what
are the e⁄ective mechanism to appropriate the returns from their ￿rms￿innovations. For drugs,
50% of managers reported patents were e⁄ective, for computers 41% and for electronics 21%.34
Thus, the sectors least likely to use patents are also those in which non-exclusive licenses are
most prevalent. Our mechanism indeed suggests that in the absence of patents these contracts
can become an e⁄ective way to protect innovations.
B. Multiplicity of Equilibria
33See Table III(i) in thier paper.
34See Table I in their paper.
16The results of section 3 were derived under the assumption that the no-delay licensing equi-
librium would be played. This equilibrium is the unique Markov Perfect equilibrium. In this
section, we focus on Subgame Perfect Equilibria. The potential multiplicity of (symmetric) SPE
of our timing game stems in part from the fact that there are multiple SPE when the sellers, in
the market for technology, compete to sell the second license.35
We obtain two important results. First, we determine the existence of a condition under which
the no-delay licensing equilibrium is the unique perfect equilibrium of the competitive subgame.
This emphasizes the importance of the results of section 3. Second, when this condition is not
satis￿ed, we capture a rich relationship between delay to enter the market (i.e. delay to buy the
￿rst license) and delay to trade the second license. More precisely: if the length of time until
the second license is traded is not too long, imitators will still delay their entry times into the
market. Otherwise, they will end up entering the market quasi instantaneously at time zero.
B1. Delay and Multiplicity of Equilibria
To simplify the exposition, for most of this section, we focus on the continuous time formula-
tion of our model.36 In this context, competition to sell the second license starts instantaneously
at time t, with the ￿rst entry of, say, imitator i. Let t2 ￿ t be the time at which the second
license is sold. The delay in trading the second license since the time of the ￿rst entry is then
d2 := (t2 ￿ t) ￿ 0. We denote by e d2 := e t2 ￿ t > 0 the maximum amount of time that imitator j
is willing to wait to buy the license at a zero price rather than copying immediately at time t.
From these de￿nitions, it follows that the no-delay licensing equilibrium corresponds to a delay
d2 = 0 and that e d2 satis￿es ￿3 ￿ ￿ = ￿3e￿re d2. Proposition 4 describes the (symmetric) pure
strategy SPE of the competitive subgame.
Proposition 4 Suppose that a market for technology exists. Then
(i) if 2￿3 > ￿2 the no-delay licensing equilibrium is the unique SPE of the competitive subgame.
(ii) if 2￿3 ￿ ￿2, for each d2 2
h
0; e d2
i
there exists a SPE in which imitator j enters the market
at time t2 = t + d2 by buying the license at a zero price.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The ￿rst part of proposition 4 establishes the important result that for some market games,
the unique SPE is the no-delay licensing equilibrium, in which a license is sold immediately. For
linear demand and Cournot competition, this condition is always satis￿ed. The intuition of the
result is the following. When 2￿3 > ￿2 the market is such that for any potential candidate
equilibrium with delay in the market for technology, a pro￿table deviation will exist for one of
the licensors. Indeed, selling a license to imitator j at the highest acceptable price, ￿3, will allow
35We return to the assumption that the inventor o⁄ers non-exclusive licensing contracts before the ￿rst entry
happens.
36We interpret the continuous time version of our model as an approximation to our previous discrete time-game
for the limiting case in which ￿ ! 0.
17the deviator to collect pro￿ts of 2￿3 rather than the duopoly pro￿ts guaranteed in equilibrium.
Thus, if this condition is satis￿ed, the unique equilibrium of the competitive subgame is the
no-delay licensing equilibrium.
It is interesting to note that the degree of competitiveness of the technology and product
markets are inversely related. A product market such that 2￿3 > ￿2 can be characterized as
not highly competitive: pro￿ts erode slowly with an increase in the number of ￿rms. However,
such a product market will create a very competitive market for technology in which licensors
will be unable to coordinate on keeping prices high.
The second part of the proposition points out, however, that when the condition is not
satis￿ed, the competition game that follows after the ￿rst entry accepts a multiplicity of SPE.
All of these SPE share a common feature: the second license is always sold at a price equal to
zero. The intuition is simple. Because the seller with the lowest price will serve the entire market
(i.e., imitator j), each seller has an incentive to undercut his rival. However, all of these SPE
are characterized by di⁄erent delays before the second license is traded. An outcome such that
the license is sold with a delay equal to d2 > 0 is a perfect equilibrium for two reasons.37 First,
imitator j; given that d2 ￿ e d2, prefers waiting that amount of time to buy a license at a zero
price rather than copying immediately. Second, the sellers, when 2￿3 ￿ ￿2, prefer collecting
duopoly pro￿ts in the market rather than deviating and receiving licensing payments.
Equilibrium payo⁄s, in period t units, for the leader and follower imitator may now be written
as
V1 = (1 ￿ e￿rd2)￿2 + e￿rd2￿3 ￿ ps;V2 = e￿rd2￿3 (8)
where d2 2
h
0; e d2
i
is a given equilibrium delay.38 The existence of delay in the market for
technology causes one conceptual novelty. The ￿rst imitator collects duopoly pro￿ts in the
market prior to the second entry. It may thus be worthwhile for imitators to become leaders
rather than followers. More precisely, as equation (9) highlights, if d2 is su¢ ciently high V1 could
be higher than V2. So, for low values of d2 our timing-game corresponds to a ￿war of attrition￿
whereas for su¢ ciently large values of d2 the imitators play a ￿preemption game￿ .
B2. Delay and Appropriation
We ￿rst establish that when the delay on the market for technology is not too long, the
imitators still delay their entry into the market.39 Proposition 5 is indeed a generalization of
Proposition 2.
Proposition 5 Let d2 2
h
0; b d2
￿
for b d2 := (1=r)ln(￿2=(￿2 ￿ ￿)) then
(i) the innovator sets a price ps = ￿ for the licenses;
37The multiplicity of equilibria is not due to well-known repeated game theory arguments: None of these equilibria
is sustained by a punishment scheme.
38To simplify the exposition, we assume that the inventor follows a non-discriminatory pricing policy.
39We insist on an important distinction. Note that d2 is the equilibrium delay in the market for technology. In
other words, it is the amount of real time that the second imitator must wait before buying a license at a zero
price. On the other hand, when we refer to ￿delay to enter the market￿ , the delay corresponds to the time elapsed
before entry of the ￿rst imitator.
18(ii) the distribution of entry times of each imitator is exponential with hazard rate equal to
￿ =
r
￿
(￿3 ￿ ￿) + (￿2 ￿ ￿3)(1 ￿ e￿rd2)
￿
[￿ ￿ (1 ￿ e￿rd2)￿2]
(iii) the inventor￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ is
Vs(￿;d2) =
￿1
(r + 2￿)
+
2￿
￿
(￿3 + ￿) + (￿2 ￿ ￿3)(1 ￿ e￿rd2)
￿
(r + 2￿)
Proof. See the Appendix.
As in Proposition 2, result (i) indicates that the innovator sets a price of ￿ for the licenses
and result (ii) shows that imitators delay their entry into the product market. However, result
(iii) establishes that, compared to the expression of Proposition 2, the innovator now collects
duopoly pro￿ts after the ￿rst entry.40 However when d2 increases, the equilibrium hazard rate
also increases and therefore the expected duration of monopoly time for the innovator decreases.
From this discussion, a natural question emerges: In which SPE does the innovator receive
her highest payo⁄? Unfortunately, the work of several countervailing forces makes di¢ cult to
analytically determine her best SPE payo⁄. On the one hand, the higher the delay in the market
for technology, the longer the time period for which the innovator retains duopoly pro￿ts after
the ￿rst entry. Furthermore, as we discussed before, a higher value of d2 increases the equilibrium
hazard rate and therefore the duopoly pro￿ts and the licensing payments are obtained earlier.
There is nevertheless a powerful o⁄setting e⁄ect: The ￿rst entry will occur, on average, earlier
and the innovator will thus obtain monopoly pro￿ts for a shorter time period.
Last, we discuss the dynamics of entry and appropriation if d2 ￿ b d2. In this case, the
equilibrium payo⁄ of the leader becomes larger than the equilibrium payo⁄ of the follower.
Besides, both of these equilibrium payo⁄s are greater than the equilibrium payo⁄of simultaneous
entry. This payo⁄ structure gives rise to a preemption game, in which entry into the market
takes place immediately at time t = 0. Formally.
Proposition 6 Let d2 2
h
b d2; e d2
i
for b d2 := (1=r)ln(￿2=(￿2 ￿ ￿)). Then
(i) as the length of a period shrinks to zero, ￿ ! 0, the unique perfect equilibrium outcome is
that entry will happen for sure at time t = 0;
(ii) the innovator sets a price for both licenses equal to ￿ and her equilibrium payo⁄ is Vs(￿;d2) =
￿V e
s + (1 ￿ ￿)V a
s where ￿(￿;d2) is the probability of simultaneous entry at t = 0 and
V e
s := 2￿ + ￿3; V a
s :=
h
￿ + (1 ￿ e￿rd2)￿2 + e￿rd2￿3
i
Proof. See the Appendix.
Observe that the innovator￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ is a convex combination of the payo⁄ that
40Note that when d2 = 0, we obtain the same results of Proposition 2.
19she receives when imitators enter the market simultaneously at t = 0 as in Proposition 3, V e
s , and
when only one of them enters the market at t = 0 and the other follows after a delay of at least
b d2, V a
s . We know, from Proposition 3, that the innovator￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ for the no-delay
licensing equilibrium, Vs(￿), is strictly higher than V e
s :Besides, straightfoward calculations show
that Vs(￿) is also strictly higher than V a
s for all values of d2 2
h
b d2; e d2
i
.
So, even though ex-post the innovator appropriates with strictly positive probability duopoly
pro￿ts, sells two licenses instead of one and receives all these payments earlier, she is still strictly
worse o⁄ than if the no-delay licensing equilibrium were played. Entry the product market
happens instantaneously and erodes her monopoly pro￿ts substantially.
In our view Propositions 2, 5 and 6 together provide a concise view of appropriation problems
in an economy without intellectual property rights. They reveal that appropriation is closely
linked to the price and the speed at which the second license will be traded in the market for
technology. When imitators expect knowledge to be di⁄used slowly through the licensing process,
entry into the market will be inevitably fast. Thus we show that if an appropriation failure exist,
it is not caused by a lack of intellectual property rights per se but rather by a di⁄erent kind of
failure coming from slow di⁄usion of knowledge in the market for technology.
5. LARGE NUMBER OF IMITATORS
In this section we examine the innovator￿ s appropriability problem in an economy populated
by a large number of potential imitators. The set of potential imitators is denoted P := f2;3:::g
and the set of active imitators by A := f0;1;:::g. The present value of equilibrium pro￿ts when
there are n active imitators is ￿n+1 for n 2 A.41 The notion that pro￿ts decrease as the number
of active rivals increases is formalized by assuming that the sequence of pro￿ts (￿n+1)n2A is
decreasing. Besides, we also suppose that pro￿ts are weakly greater than zero.42 Thus, the
sequence (￿n+1)n2A converges to zero.
In the previous sections, Assumption 1 (￿3 > ￿) guaranteed that copying was a valuable
activity for all potential imitators. When the number of potential imitators becomes large, such
an assumption becomes di¢ cult to satisfy. We thus consider two cases. The ￿rst case, in the
continuity of the previous sections, assumes that the imitation cost is smaller than the present
value of pro￿ts, ￿n+1, for all n 2 P. To allow for this, the imitation cost must also diminish
as the number of active imitators increases. Hence we call this scenario variable imitation cost.
The second case is one where, when n is su¢ ciently large, the pro￿ts ￿n+1 are smaller than the
imitation cost.
Independently of the case considered, we show that when the number of potential imitators
becomes su¢ ciently large, the number of active imitators converges to zero and the innovator￿ s
equilibrium payo⁄ converges to the present value of monopoly pro￿ts.43 This result challenges
41Note that n imitators and the innovator share the market and thus we obtain pro￿ts ￿n+1.
42This assumption corresponds for instance to a case in which there are no ￿xed costs.
43In this section, in contrast to the previous sections, the assumption that those imitators who enter by copying
can also sell knowledge turns out to be important for our main result.
20the classical arguments calling for intellectual property rights.44
A. Variable Imitation Cost
To maintain the spirit of Assumption 1, we introduce its equivalent for a large economy.
Assumption 2: 8n 2 P : (￿n+1 ￿ ￿n) > 0
Since pro￿ts converge to zero as the number of active imitators increases, this assumption
requires that the imitation cost depends on n. Moreover, observe that the sequence of imitation
costs (￿n)
1
n=2 must also converge to zero. It is important to realize that this assumption should
not be interpreted literally. Assumption 2 is rather a modelling device which guarantees that
even for large economies imitation is still pro￿table for all potential imitators. Note that it
captures well situations where the imitation cost is very small.
We also make an additional assumption that restricts the rate at which the imitation cost
varies with n. Assumption 3 turns out to be important for our main result.
Assumption 3: limn!1 (￿n+1=￿n) = 1
Under these assumptions, if the market for technology is missing, it is a simple extension of
Proposition 1 to show that in a large economy (i.e., as n ! 1) there is a unique SPE in which: (i)
All imitators copy the innovation immediately at time zero and (ii) The innovator￿ s equilibrium
payo⁄ converges to zero. Thus, as the conventional wisdom suggests, innovation would never
take place without intellectual property rights.
We now turn to the question of appropriability in the presence of a market for technology.
Similar to the no-delay licensing equilibrium of Section 3, we focus on the equilibrium outcome
such that, after the ￿rst entry, the innovator and all active imitators immediately o⁄er licenses
to the remaining imitators at a zero price.
Proposition 7 If Assumptions 2 and 3 hold, the unique symmetric MPE is such that:
(i) the innovator sets a price psn = ￿n for the licenses;
(ii) the distribution of entry times of each imitator is exponential with hazard rate equal to
￿n =
r(￿n+1 ￿ ￿n)
(n ￿ 1)￿n
(iii) as n ! 1 the innovator￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ converges to monopoly pro￿ts:
lim
n!1
V n
s (￿n) = ￿1
Proof. See the Appendix.
44The traditional arguments should be particularly relevant in this case with a large number of imitators who
should theoretically reduce the pro￿ts of the innovator to zero.
21This proposition fundamentally challenges the received conventional wisdom: It states that
when the number of potential imitators becomes su¢ ciently large, the innovator will receive an
equilibrium payo⁄ arbitrarily close to monopoly pro￿ts.
To give an intuition for this result it is important to ￿rst understand the role played by
Assumption 3. Note, on the one hand, that when n ! 1 the equilibrium price of the ￿rst
license, ￿n, converges to zero. So, as n ! 1, the bene￿ts of waiting converge to zero.45 But, on
the other hand, the opportunity cost of waiting (i.e. the pro￿tability of copying (￿n+1 ￿ ￿n))
also converges to zero, as n ! 1. Assumption 3 guarantees that these two terms decrease at
the same rate and for this reason, in the limit, the following ratio
(￿n+1 ￿ ￿n)
￿n
becomes negligible. Thus as n goes to in￿nity, the individual hazard rate ￿n converges to zero.
However, the equilibrium payo⁄ of the innovator depends on the time of the ￿rst entry and
thus on the aggregate hazard rate, n￿n. Result (iii) establishes that as n ! 1, n￿n ! 0 and the
innovator￿ s pro￿ts converge to monopoly. Indeed an increase in the number of potential imitators
is compensated by a decrease in the hazard rate of each individual imitator thus postponing the
time of ￿rst entry.
The fact that the individual hazard rate ￿n is divided by n ￿ 1 summarizes an important
message of this paper. Note that the imitator who buys the ￿rst license provides a positive
(pecuniary) externality to the rest of the imitators. Indeed the ￿rst entrant creates competition
in the market for technology and the rest of the imitators bene￿t by buying licenses at a zero price.
So, rational imitators anticipating the possibility of receiving these future positive externalities
delay their entry into the market. When the number of imitators becomes large, the incentives
of each individual imitator to buy the ￿rst license are decreased, as the pool of potential ￿rst
entrants becomes larger.46
B. Fixed Imitation Cost
We consider the second case such that the imitation cost remains ￿xed at a level ￿ > 0
independently of n. Therefore for n large enough Assumption 2 is not satis￿ed and pro￿ts become
strictly smaller than ￿. We denote by K the number of imitators such that ￿K+2 < ￿ ￿ ￿K+1.
As in the previous case, we focus on the equilibrium such that, after the ￿rst entry, the innovator
and all active imitators immediately o⁄er licenses to the remaining imitators at a zero price. We
obtain the following result.
45The bene￿t of waiting is the di⁄erence bewteen the price of the ￿rst and the price of the second license.
46More formally, consider an imitator, say imitator i, that must decide whether to wait a period of time equal
to ￿ or buy a license at time t. If he buys it at t, he will be the leader and obtain a payo⁄ equal to V1. However,
if he chooses to buy it at t + ￿, he will buy it at a zero price if at least one of the other n ￿ 1 imitators bought it
before him. In a behavior equilibrium, imitator i must be indi⁄erent between buying at time t and buying at time
t+￿. But when the number of imitators increases, the probability that at least one of them buys a license before
imitator i also increases. So, he will remain indi⁄erent between t and t + ￿ if and only if, the other imitators
decrease their corresponding probabilities of buying a license in the time interval ￿.
22Proposition 8 As ￿ ! 1 and for all n > K, the unique symmetric MPE is such that no imitator
initially enters the market and the innovator￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ equal monopoly pro￿ts.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The result of Proposition 8 has a ￿ avor similar to the holdup problem. An imitator is willing
to buy the ￿rst license by making a sunk payment equal to ￿ only if he anticipates that his
pro￿ts will cover this cost. He will thus buy the ￿rst license if and only if he anticipates that at
most K ￿1 other imitators will also enter the market. But, after he enters, intense rivalry in the
market for technology leads to an entrance of n ￿ 1 > K ￿ 1 imitators as they pay a zero price
for the second license. Thus entry can never be initially pro￿table and the innovator will retain
monopoly rents forever.47
6. RELATED LITERATURE
Our results are related to several branches of the literature. First, our paper is connected
with a literature that argues in favor of weakening intellectual property rights. In a sequence
of papers, Boldrin and Levine (2002, 2004, 2005, 2007) have proposed a new model of creative
activity under perfect competition. These papers share the essential idea that innovative rents
equal the discounted value of the revenue stream generated by the ￿rst unit(s) of the prototype(s)
created by the inventor. We emphasize in our paper a di⁄erent mechanism based on the dynamics
of the market for technology. Our purpose is to depart in a minimal way from the conventional
model. Indeed we only introduce the market for licenses. Our work complements theses papers
by showing the existence of a di⁄erent source of rents in the absence of intellectual property
rights.48
Maurer and Scotchmer (2002) study the consequences of introducing independent invention
defence in the patent system.49 In their paper, the inventor can always ￿nd suitable ￿xed-fee
and royalty licensing contracts to deter the duplication of R&D costs by independent inventors.50
They show that if the cost of independent invention is more than half the initial research cost, the
innovator can deter duplication through licensing and still recover her R&D cost. As our work,
this paper emphasizes the importance of the market for technology for the innovator￿ s rents but
our approach and results di⁄er on several accounts. First, whereas the analysis in Maurer and
Scotchmer (2002) is static, our model is built to capture the dynamic trading relationships that
exist between innovators and imitators in the market for technology. Second, we emphasize the
important of non-exclusive contracts as a commitment device. Third, we ￿nd that even for small
47These results are closely linked to Boldrin and Levine (2008). The authors argue that if competition on the
product market is severe enough and there is a ￿xed cost of imitation (equivalent to the cost ￿ in our paper)
imitators might refrain from initially entering. The environment they consider does not include a market for
technology, but has the inventor moving ￿rst and choosing quantities before the imitators. She can therefore
choose to produce more than the monopoly quantity, to decrease prices and thus discourage imitation.
48As pointed out in section 5, the results for a large number of imitators are also linked to Boldrin and Levine
(2008).
49Under independent invention defence, independent inventors (imitators who reverse engineer the product) are
allowed to share the market with the innovator.
50These contracts decrease pro￿ts on the market.
23reverse engineering costs, the inventor can appropriate large rents due to the dynamics of the
market.51 Note however that a cautious reinterpretation of our model in the spirit of their paper
suggests that our ￿ndings also argue in favour of an independent invention defence.
The use of licensing to preserve monopoly rents has also been of interest in the literature.
Gallini (1984) shows that an incumbent could license her innovation to eliminate the incentives
of a rival to develop his own superior technology. Rockett (1990) shows how an innovator can
use licensing to crowd out the market by weak competitors and thus to prevent entry of strong
rivals. Although our paper relates to this literature there are clear di⁄erences. In particular, in
our setting imitators are homogeneous and the innovator deters entry through a subtle use of
non-exclusive licensing contracts.
Other explanations for the existence of endogenous delay in imitation have also been proposed.
Scherer (1980) suggests that technological constraints generates ￿natural lags￿in imitation. This
explanation does not depend on the strategic responses of imitators. Benoit (1985) shows how
an endogenous delay can emerge if the pro￿tability of a non-patentable innovation is uncertain
and gradually revealed over time to a unique imitator. We do not introduce asymmetric infor-
mation but rather build on the strategic interactions between several imitators in the market for
technology.
Choi (1998) is closest to our paper in that the e⁄ect of imitation on the innovator is obtained
through endogenous entry that results from strategic interaction between imitators. However, in
his paper imitation occurs in a world with imperfect patent rights and the interaction between
imitators is controlled by information transmission through possible infringement suits. In con-
trast, our paper focuses on a setting without patent rights and in which the strategic interaction
is dominated by the dynamics of the price of licenses. For instance, the main results of Choi
(1998) are driven by an informational externality: If an imitator enters the market and the inno-
vator responds with an infringement suit, the second imitator will receive information concerning
the outcome of that suit. In contrast, our results are mainly driven by a pecuniary externality:
After the ￿rst imitator enters the market, the equilibrium price of the second license will fall to
its marginal cost.52
A paper by Arora and Fosfuri (2003) focuses on the interaction between the product market
and the market for technology in a static environment. The paper highlights that it can be
optimal for a ￿rm to license out its technology to a rival. In a static model, it proves that, under
certain conditions, the revenues that the ￿rm expects from licensing to a rival dominates the loss
due to the erosion of overall industry pro￿ts. This paper shares some similarities with the analysis
of what we have called the competitive subgame. More precisely, the trade-o⁄ considered in this
paper is comparable to the one that guarantees uniqueness of the no-delay licensing equilibrium
in the competitive subgame.53
51The cost of research of the inventor is not explicitely de￿ned in our model. But a similar comparison between
the rents of the inventor and the cost ￿ of reverse engineering is performed in section 3.
52We note that also Bernheim (1984) examines the dynamics of entry deterrence. The dynamics are however very
di⁄erent than in our model. In particular, Bernheim (1984) assumes that entrants are ordered in an exogenously
given sequence.
53See in particular the condition in Proposition 4.
24Last, as pointed out in the introduction, licensing without intellectual property rights can
be a subtle issue in the presence of asymmetric information. Anton and Yao (1994, 2002) have
underlined this concern. For instance, Anton and Yao (1994) study the problem of an inventor
who can license her idea to two ￿rms. Buyers are reluctant to buy before learning the quality
of the idea but if the idea were revealed, they could potentially steal it. Anton and Yao (1994)
propose a subtle solution to this expropriation problem.54 In the environment that we consider,
asymmetries of information should be minimal and the concerns studied by Anton and Yao (1994,
2002) can be left aside. Indeed, the innovation is already commercialized at the start of the game
and its success is publicly observable.
7. CONCLUSION
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a concise view of appropriability problems
in an economy without intellectual property rights but with markets for technology. The results
of this paper reveal that the set of markets in which innovators and imitators interact is crucial
to understand how the rents generated by the arrival of new technologies are divided between
economic agents.
In the absence of a market for licenses, our model can be seen as a simple theoretical founda-
tion for the received conventional wisdom. However once we allow for simple trading interactions
between innovators and imitators, new and surprising insights are obtained. In general, the intro-
duction of markets for technology dissipates the appropriability problem. The innovator collects
monopoly pro￿ts, at least temporarily, in most of the cases that we have focused on. The coun-
terpart of this result is that each imitator delays his entry on the market with the hope that
his rival will enter before him. To generate this delay, the innovator optimally chooses to grant
non-exclusive licensing contracts. Indeed, non-exclusivity is crucial to change the structure of the
market for technology (from monopoly to duopoly) and thus to create the bene￿cial competition
that results in the reduction of the price of the second license.
In Section 4 we highlighted cases where the appropriability problem might reemerge and these
results are suggestive. They show that if an appropriation failure exists, it is not caused by a
lack of intellectual property rights per se but rather by a ￿coordination￿problem related to how
quickly knowledge is di⁄used in the market for technology. The message of this paper can be
reexpressed as follows: When knowledge is quickly di⁄used after the ￿rst entry appropriability
concerns are generally dissipated.
Because we have examined appropriability problems, we formulated a very simple and suitable
model for this particular goal. Thus, we have not considered several interesting issues which
could be the object of future research. First, our model does not consider the possibility of
sequential improvements to the current innovation. In this context, licensing may provide not
only knowledge to imitate the current innovation but also to discover a future improvement.
54The mechanism that solves this problem starts with full revelation by the inventor. The buyer will still sign
a contract under the threat by the inventor that she will reveal the idea to the competitor if he decided to copy
without paying. Anton and Yao (2002) also discuss a di⁄erent mechanism for this problem based on partial
disclosure of the idea and the issuance of a bond.
25Second, we have assumed that the imitation cost is common knowledge. In an extension of this
paper, it would be interesting to presume that imitators have private information about their cost
of copying and to examine how this private information a⁄ects the innovator￿ s equilibrium payo⁄.
Third, our model considers an stationary environment in which market demand is implicitly the
same over time. Examining a framework in which market demand changes over time (i.e. a
growing market size) would also be an interesting exercise.
We show that even in the absence of intellectual property rights and in an environment suf-
￿ciently close to the traditional one, inventors are able to collect substantial economic rents.
An essential future step will be to answer the following question: Without intellectual property
rights, do innovators appropriate an equilibrium payo⁄ equal to the social value of their contri-
bution (see Ostroy and Makowski (1995))? Recently, Shapiro (2007) has argued that under the
current patent system innovators capture private rewards that exceed their social contributions.
Could the dynamics of prices in the market for technology appropriately tailor these rents to
their social contributions?
We conclude by o⁄ering a di⁄erent perspective on our results. Two very in￿ uential surveys
(Yale Survey (1983) and Carnegie Mellon Survey (1994)) have asked managers to rank the most
e¢ cient means of protecting their innovations. The Yale Survey, conducted in 1983, reports
that for both product and process innovations, secrecy was consistently ranked as one of the
worst methods to protect an innovation. The Carnegie Mellon Survey, conducted ten years
later, reports, on the contrary, that secrecy was consistently ranked ￿rst. As Cohen et al (2000)
point out, there is no apparent explanation for the ￿growth in the importance of secrecy as an
appropriability mechanism￿ . This fact is particularly surprising, since the period between 1983
and 1994 was one where patent protection tended to strengthen.
Number of industries ranking secrecy as:
Mechanism 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Secrecy 1983 (process) 2 10 19 2
Secrecy 1994 (process) 21 10 1 1
Secrecy 1983 (product) 0 0 11 22
Secrecy 1994 (product) 13 11 2 5
We believe that the mechanism highlighted in this paper o⁄ers a potential explanation for the
previous puzzle. Indeed, a ￿rm choosing secrecy is not protected against imitation by competi-
tors. However, as emphasized in this paper, in the presence of a market for technology, imitators
might delay entry. Thus, more active licensing markets might increase the returns that ￿rms can
expect from choosing secrecy. Licensing activity did indeed intensify in the period 1983 to 1994.
Arora et. al. (2002) using data compiled by the Securities Data Company report that the total
number of disclosed licensing deals during the period 1985 to 1989 was 1130 while for the years
1993 and 1994, 2009 and 2426 deals were signed respectively.55 Our model can thus reconcile
55The Securities Data Company contains data on licensing deals and joint venture
26the parallel increase in the popularity of both secrecy and licensing, providing therefore a novel
explanation for this puzzle. This is yet another perspective on our results.
REFERENCES
Anand, B. and T. Khanna (2000): ￿The Structure of Licensing Contracts,￿The Journal
of Industrial Economics, 48, 103-135.
Anton, J. and D. Yao (1994): ￿Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the
Absence of Property Rights,￿The American Economic Review, 84, 190-209.
Anton, J. and D. Yao (2002): ￿The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights and
Contracting,￿The Review of Economic Studies, 69, 513-531.
Arora, A., Fosfuri, A. and A. Gambardella (2002): Markets for Technology: the Eco-
nomics of Innovation and Corporate Strategy. The MIT Press
Arora, A. and A. Fosfuri (2003): ￿Licensing the Market for Technologies,￿Journal of Eco-
nomic Behavior and Organization, 52, 277-295.
Benoit, J. (1985): ￿Innovation and Imitation in a Duopoly￿ , Review of Economic Studies, 52,
99-106.
Bernheim, D. (1984): ￿Strategic Deterrence of Sequential Entry into an Industry,￿The Rand
Journal of Economics, 15, 1-11.
Boldrin, M. and D. Levine (2002): ￿The Case Against Intellectual Property,￿The American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 92: 209-212.
Boldrin, M. and D. Levine (2004): ￿IER Lawrence Klein Lecture: The Case Against Intel-
lectual Monopoly,￿International Economic Review, 45: 327-350.
Boldrin, M. and D. Levine (2005): ￿Intellectual Property and the E¢ cient Allocation of
Surplus from Creation,￿Review of Research on Copyright Issues, 2: 45-66.
Boldrin, M. and D. Levine (2008): ￿Perfectly Competitive Innovation,￿Journal of Monetary
Economics, forthcoming.
Cesaroni, F. (2001): ￿Technology Strategies in the Knowledge Economy. The Licensing Ac-
tivity of Himont,￿working paper.
Cesaroni, F. and M. Mariani (2001): ￿The Market for Knowledge in the Chemical Sector,￿
in Technology and Markets for Knowledge, edited by Bernard Guilhon. Kluwer Academic Pub-
lishers.
Choi, J. P. (1998): ￿Patent Litigation as an Information-Transmission Mechanism,￿The Amer-
ican Economic Review, 88, 1249-1263.
Cohen, W., Nelson, R. and J. Walsh (2000): ￿Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appro-
priability Conditions and Why US Manufacturing Firms Patent (or not),￿NBER working paper.
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991): Game Theory, The MIT Press.
Gallini, N. (1984): ￿Deterrence by Market Sharing: A Strategic Incentive for Licensing,￿The
American Economic Review, 84, 190-209.
Heindricks, K., Weiss, A. and C. Wilson (1988): ￿The War of Attrition in Continuous
Time with Complete Information,￿International Economic Review, 29, 663-680.
27Makowski, L. and J. Ostroy (1995): ￿Appropriation and E¢ ciency: A Revision of the First
Theorem of Welfare Economics,￿The American Economic Review, 85, 808-827.
Marshall, A and I. Olkin (2007): Life distributions: structure of nonparametric, semipara-
metric, and parametric families. Springer Series in Statistics
Maurer, S. and S. Scotchmer (2002): ￿The Independent Invention Defence in Intellectual
Property,￿Economica, 69, 535-547.
Rockett, K. (1990), ￿Choosing the Competition and Patent Licensing,￿Rand Journal of Eco-
nomics, 21, 161-171.
Scherer, F. (1980): ￿Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance,￿
Shapiro, C. (1985): ￿Patent Licensing and R&D Rivalry,￿The American Economic Review,
75, 25-30.
Shapiro, C. (2007): ￿Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution,￿Innovation Policy
and the Economy, volume 8, 111-156
APPENDIX
Proof of proposition 1. A pure strategy for imitator h 2 fi;jg must prescribe at each
period t whether to ￿to copy￿or ￿not to copy￿ . We proceed in steps.
First, we consider the single decision problem that follows a history in which only one imitator,
say imitator j, has copied.
Step1. Suppose that imitator j has chosen ￿to copy￿at period t￿1. Then, the unique best
response of imitator i is ￿to copy￿at period t.
To see that, observe that by copying at any period ti ￿ t he obtains a payo⁄ in period t units
of Vi(ti) = ￿(ti￿t) (￿3 ￿ ￿) and clearly t = argmaxti2[t;1) Vi(ti).
Now we turn our attention to those histories that start at period t and in which no imitator
has copied yet. Given the symmetry of the game, we study the best response of imitator i to the
following two strategies of imitator j.
Step 2. Suppose that the strategy of imitator j dictates ￿to copy￿at period t. Then, the
unique best response for imitator i is also ￿to copy￿at period t.
This follows directly because if imitator i chooses ￿to copy￿at period ti ￿ t he receives a
payo⁄ in period t units equal to Vi(ti) = ￿(ti￿t) (￿3 ￿ ￿) and clearly t = argmaxti2[t;1) Vi(ti).
Step 3. Suppose that the strategy of imitator j dictates ￿to copy￿at a period tj > t. Then,
the unique best response for imitator i is ￿to copy￿at period t.
We know, from step 1, that if imitator i copies at ti < tj the strategy of imitator j prescribes
￿to copy￿at period ti +1 (i.e., ￿ units of real time later). Thus, if imitator i chooses ￿to copy￿
at period t ￿ ti < tj he obtains a payo⁄in period t units of Vi(t) = ￿(ti￿t) [(1 ￿ ￿)￿2 + ￿￿3 ￿ ￿].
But if he chooses ￿to copy￿at period ti ￿ tj he receives a payo⁄ in period t units of Vi(t) =
￿(ti￿t) [￿3 ￿ ￿]. Comparing these payo⁄s, it is evident that the unique best response for imitator
i is ￿to copy￿at period t, without delay.
So, our analysis reveals that there is a unique SPE in which imitators choose ￿to copy￿
immediately at all periods in which copy has not occurred yet. Thus the unique equilibrium
28outcome is such that both imitators choose ￿to copy￿at period zero and such that the equilibrium
payo⁄s for the inventor and the imitators are ￿3 and ￿3 ￿ ￿ respectively.
Lemma 0: Consider the following strategies for the sellers (imitator i and the inventor) and
for imitator j.
p￿
yj = 0, for y = i;s for all feasible histories if entry has not happened yet, for all ￿ ￿ t + 1
￿j =
8
> <
> :
￿enter￿by ‘ buying from b y if b p ￿ minf￿;(1 ￿ ￿)￿3g, for all ￿ ￿ t + 1
￿enter￿by c if ￿ ￿ minfb p;(1 ￿ ￿)￿3g, for all ￿ ￿ t + 1
￿wait￿or ￿do not enter￿if minfb p;￿g > (1 ￿ ￿)￿3 for all ￿ ￿ t + 1
where b y denotes the identity of the seller who o⁄ers the minimum license price and b p :=
miny2fi;sg pyj. Furthermore ‘ denotes the strategy of buying a license and c of copying.
These strategies constitute a MPE and they give rise to the no-delay licensing equilibrium
outcome.
Proof of Lemma 0. We ￿rst note that the strategies described above give rise to the no-delay
licensing equilibrium outcome described in the main text. We now prove that these strategies
form a subgame perfect nash equilibrium. For the sellers it is clear that, given any history and
the strategy of the other players, they do not have strict incentives to deviate from the actions
prescribed by their strategies. As to imitator j, we make the following two observations. First,
note that if he chooses to enter at the present period, he will do it either by licensing from
the seller with lowest license price or by copying the innovation, whatever alternative is more
pro￿table. Second, if he chooses to enter at the current period rather than wait one period and
buy a license at the next at a zero price it must be that
maxf￿3 ￿ b p;￿3 ￿ ￿g ￿ ￿￿3
where ￿3 ￿ b p is the payo⁄ in present units of buying by licensing, ￿3 ￿ ￿ is the payo⁄ in
present units of copying and ￿￿3 is the payo⁄ in current units of waiting and buying a license
at a zero price next period. It follows then that imitator j will enter by buying a license if
and only if (i⁄, henceforth) b p ￿ minf￿;(1 ￿ ￿)￿3g. On the contrary, he will enter by copying
i⁄ ￿ ￿ minfb p;(1 ￿ ￿)￿3g. So, it is easy to see that he will not enter at the current period i⁄
(1 ￿ ￿)￿3 > minfb p;￿g.
Proof of Lemma 1 As we observed in the main text, the payo⁄relevant history is determined
in our model by the number of imitators who are active in the market at each time period. Thus,
the following partition H := fH0;H1g, where Hn is a set that collects all those histories for which
n = 0;1 imitators are active in the market, is the minimal (coarsest) su¢ cient partition that
permit us to de￿ne MPE. A strategy for the innovator, ￿s, is Markovian if it is measurable with
respect to the corresponding partitions. Formally, if the history b h￿ 2 Hn(e h￿) for some n = 0;1,
then the continuation strategy ￿sjb h￿ must equal the continuation strategy ￿sje h￿.
Measurability implies that the inventor￿ s strategy must prescribe the same pair of prices
psh 2 R+ [f+1g for each period ￿ ￿ t at which entry has not taken place yet. We claim that a
29necessary condition for a Markovian licensing strategy, ￿s, to be optimal is that it should dictate
to sell two licenses at prices psh ￿ ￿ for h 2 fi;jg. The idea is simple. Any Markovian strategy
which does not satisfy this necessary condition is weakly dominated by ￿s and therefore it can
not be optimal. There are at most two of these strategies. One, the inventor sells no licences:
psh = +1 for h 2 fi;jg, denoted by ￿1
ij . And the other, the inventor sells just one license, say
to imitator i: psj = +1. We denote this strategy ￿1
j :
Notice that when the innovator uses either ￿1
ij or ￿1
j the entry cost of imitator h 2 fi;jg
in the ￿rst case and of imitator j in the second one equals ￿. The inventor must therefore be
weakly better o⁄ when she uses ￿s than when she adopts strategy ￿1
ij . When she uses ￿s, she
can always set psh = ￿ for h 2 fi;jg and imitators would face the same entry cost as when she
employs ￿1
ij . Thus, she will receive at least the same expected market pro￿ts by using ￿s as
when she uses ￿1
ij . But she will obtain higher licensing revenues, if entry happens, because it
will take place through licensing. The same argument holds for the case of ￿1
j .
Proof of Proposition 2. In this proposition, we determine the unique symmetric MPE
when ￿ goes to zero. We proceed in a number of steps. Because the proof is long, we succinctly
describe each step. In step 1, we show that when the time discount associated with ￿ is small
enough there exists at least a MPE in behavior strategies. In the second step, we derive su¢ cient
conditions which guarantee uniqueness. In step 3, we obtain the limiting equilibrium distribution
when ￿ ! 0. In step 4, we determine the expected payo⁄ of the inventor for a given pair of
licensing prices psi and psj. Finally, in step 5, we show that the optimal license prices are
psi = psj = ￿.
Step 1. If ￿ ￿ ￿E := [￿2 ￿ ￿]=￿2 and if minfpsi;psjg 2 (pE;￿] (for pE :=
￿
1 ￿ ￿E
￿
￿2)
then a MPE in behavior strategies exists.
Notice that if minfpsi;psjg > pE then V 2
h ￿ V 1
h > 0 for h 2 fi;jg and our game is a
￿war of attrition￿ . The weak inequality ￿ ￿ ￿E guarantees that pE ￿ ￿. De￿ne Q( j) :=
 jV b
i + (1 ￿  j)V 1
i as the value for imitator j of buying a license in the current period and
W( j) :=  jV 2
i + (1 ￿  j)￿Q( j) as the value for imitator j of buying a license in the next
period. Then, Wi
￿
 j
￿
:= W
￿
 j
￿
￿ Q
￿
 j
￿
and note that
Wi
￿
 j
￿
=  j
h
V 2
i ￿ V b
i
i
+ (1 ￿  j)
￿
￿Q( j) ￿ V 1
i
￿
= 0 (A1)
describes the equilibrium condition for imitator i to be indi⁄erent between buying a license at
period t or buying it ￿ extra units of time later. We show that Wi
￿
 j
￿
= 0 has at least one
solution  ￿
j 2 (0;1). To see this, observe that Wi (0) = ￿Q(0) ￿ V 1
i = ￿V 1
i (1 ￿ ￿) < 0. By the
continuity of Wi in  j, Wi
￿
 j
￿
= 0 has at least one solution  ￿
j 2 (0;1) i⁄Wi (1) =
￿
V 2
i ￿ V b
i
￿
=
psi ￿ ￿3 (1 ￿ ￿) > 0 () psi > (1 ￿ ￿)￿3. But by assumption psi > pE >
￿
1 ￿ ￿E
￿
￿3 and
hence Wi (1) > 0. So Wi
￿
 j
￿
= 0 has at least one solution. By symmetry Wj ( i) = 0 also has
at least one solution.
Step 2. Suppose that ￿ ￿ max
￿
￿E;￿U
￿
and that minfpsi;psjg 2 (pU;￿], then there exists
30a unique MPE in behavior strategies; where
￿U :=
￿￿ +
p
￿2 ￿ 8￿2
4￿
; pU :=
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(2￿ ￿ 1)
￿
and ￿ := ￿2 ￿ ￿3; ￿ := (￿ ￿ 3￿).
To demonstrate uniqueness, it su¢ ces to show that Wi
￿
 j
￿
is strictly increasing in the unit
interval. Because Wi
￿
 j
￿
and Q( j) are C1 functions, we have
W
j
i
￿
 j
￿
:=
dWi
￿
 j
￿
d j
=
h
V 2
i ￿ V b
i
i
￿
￿
￿Q( j) ￿ V 1
i
￿
+ (1 ￿  j)￿
dQ( j)
d j
Then, using the de￿nition of Q( j), we have that W
j
i
￿
 j
￿
= (V 2
i ￿ V b
i ) + V 1
i (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿(V 1
i ￿
V b
i )(2 j ￿ 1). So a su¢ cient condition for Wi
￿
 j
￿
to be strictly increasing in the unit interval
is that W
j
i (0) = (V 2
i ￿ V b
i ) + V 1
i (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(V 1
i ￿ V b
i ) = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ 2￿) + ￿psi > 0; where the
last equality comes from using our derivations in the main text for V 1
i , V 2
i and V b
i . Therefore
the condition psi ￿ pU is su¢ cient for uniqueness.56 So, the only remaining step is to prove that
pU ￿ ￿. The condition pU ￿ ￿ is equivalent to Z(￿) := 2￿￿2 +￿￿ +￿ > 0; where ￿ := (￿ ￿ 3￿).
Then, recall that ￿U is equal to
￿U :=
￿￿ +
p
￿2 ￿ 8￿2
4￿
and notice that ￿U is the largest solution to the quadratic equation Z(￿) = 0. It therefore follows
that: (i) ￿U < 1, given that when ￿ = 1, Z(￿) = ￿ > 0; and (ii) 8￿ > ￿U : Z(￿) > 0, given that
Z(￿) is a strictly convex function of ￿. So ￿ > ￿U guarantees that pU ￿ ￿.57
Thus the conditions speci￿ed in this step ensure that there is a unique solution to the equation
Wi
￿
 j
￿
= 0. By symmetry, the same arguments apply to imitator j. Finally, we conclude by
obtaining an explicit solution for  ￿
h for h 2 fi;jg. Observe that Wi( ￿
j) = 0 can be rearranged
as follows
Wi( ￿
j) := a 2
j + b j + c = 0 (A2)
where a := ￿
￿
V 1
i ￿ V b
i
￿
= ￿(1 ￿ ￿) > 0; b :=
￿
V 2
i ￿ V b
i
￿
+ ￿
￿
V b
i ￿ V 1
i
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)V 1
i > 0 and
￿nally c := ￿(1 ￿ ￿)V 1
i < 0.58 Recalling that a, b and c are functions of ￿, the unique solution
to equation (A2) can be written as
 ￿
j(￿) =
￿b +
p
b2 ￿ 4ac
2a
(A3)
By symmetry we can derive an analogous result for imitator i.
56Because if pU ￿ pE existence would imply uniqueness and step 1 would be enough.
57Note that we consider the case in which ￿ ￿ 0. The situation in which ￿ > 0 is easy to handle. Because
￿ > 0, Z(￿) is an strictly increasing function of ￿ and Z(0) = ￿ > 0. Thus, when ￿ > 0, our claim follows directly.
58We drop the symbol ￿ just for convenience.
31Step 3. When ￿ goes to zero the limiting distribution of entry times for each imitator is
exponentially distributed with hazard rate ￿i = r(￿3 ￿ psj)=psj and ￿j = r(￿3 ￿ psi)=psi.
We prove this result for imitator j. Note that as ￿ goes to zero, ￿ converges to 1 and
therefore the conditions on the parameter ￿ imposed in steps 1 and 2 guaranteeing existence and
uniqueness are indeed satis￿ed.
As ￿ ! 0 our interest resides in obtaining the hazard rate of the distribution of entry times
for the imitators. Therefore, at period t, conditional on no imitator having entered into the
market yet, we are interested in examining whether the following limit
lim
￿#0
Prft < tj ￿ t + ￿jtj ￿ tg
￿
= lim
￿#0
 ￿
j(￿)
￿
exists; where tj is the entry time for imitator j. We can rewrite  ￿
j as
 ￿
j =
￿
￿b +
p
b2 ￿ 4ac
￿￿
b +
p
b2 ￿ 4ac
￿
2a
￿
1
b +
p
b2 ￿ 4ac
=
u(￿)
v(￿)
where u(￿) := ￿2c and v(￿) := b +
p
b2 ￿ 4ac. As ￿ ! 0 we have that ￿ ! 1, a ! 0, b ! psi
and c ! 0. Using these results, we obtain that lim￿#0 u = 0 and lim￿#0 v = 2psi. Overall
lim￿#0  ￿
j = 0 and lim￿#0
 ￿
j(￿)
￿ = lim￿#0
@ ￿
j
@￿ = lim￿#0
￿
u0v￿uv0
v2
￿
. Because u0(0) = 2r(￿3 ￿ psi)
and v0(0) = ￿2r(￿ + psi) we have that
￿j := lim
￿#0
 ￿
j(￿)
￿
=
u0(0)
v(0)
=
r(￿3 ￿ psi)
psi
Recall that a distribution has a constant hazard rate if and only if it is an exponential distrib-
ution (See, for example, Proposition B.2, page 297, Marshall and Olkin). Thus, the cumulative
distribution function of entry times for imitator j is Gj(t) = 1 ￿ e￿￿jt, t ￿ 0. By a symmetric
argument it is straightforward to determine the limiting distribution of entry times for imitator
i.
Step 4: The inventor￿ s discounted expected payo⁄ is: Vs(psi;psj) = ￿1
r+￿i+￿j +
(￿i+￿j)￿3
r+￿i+￿j +
￿ipsi+￿jpsj
r+￿i+￿j .
The expected payo⁄ of the innovator depends on the time of the ￿rst entry, t1, a random
variable that takes values in [0;1). By de￿nition t1 := minfti;tjg. Also it is a well-known fact
that because ti and tj are independent random variables with hazard rates equal to ￿i and ￿j,
t1 has a hazard rate equal to ￿i +￿j. Now suppose t1 = t 2 [0;1). Because the second imitator
enters instantaneously at time t, the inventor obtains: (i) A ￿ ow of monopoly pro￿ts ￿1 up to
time t; (ii) A ￿ ow of triopoly pro￿ts ￿3 from time t on; and (iii) At time t, she receives either
psi or psj depending on the identity of the ￿rst imitator. So, her expected payo⁄ is
Vs(pi;pj;t) =
￿1
r
￿
1 ￿ e￿rt￿
+ e￿rt￿3 + e￿rt
￿
￿i
￿i + ￿j
psi +
￿j
￿i + ￿j
psj
￿
where the last term follows from the de￿nition of hazard rates. Because ti and tj are exponentially
32distributed random variables, t1 is also exponentially distributed with parameter ￿i+￿j.59 Hence,
the inventor￿ s discounted expected payo⁄ is
Vs(psi;psj) =
￿1
r + ￿i + ￿j
+
￿i + ￿j
r + ￿i + ￿j
￿3 +
￿ipsi + ￿jpsj
r + ￿i + ￿j
Step 5. The payo⁄ maximizing licensing prices are p￿
si = p￿
sj = ￿.
The goal of the inventor is to choose a pair of prices fpsi;psjg in order to maximize Vs(psi;psj).
The derivative of Vs(psi;psj) with respect to psi is
@Vs
@psi
:= V i
s =
￿i
D
￿
1
D2
@￿j
@psi
[￿1 ￿ ￿3 ￿ psjr ￿ psj￿i + ￿ipsi]
where D := (r + ￿i + ￿j). Using, from step 3, the result for ￿i we have that V i
s reduces to:
V i
s = ￿i
D ￿ 1
D2
@￿j
@psi [￿1 ￿ 2￿3 + ￿ipsi]. And because, we know from step 3, that @￿j=@psi < 0,
it follows that, for all values of psj, Vs(psi;psj) is strictly increasing in psi since ￿1 > 2￿3 for
all market games that we consider. By symmetry, Vs(psi;psj) is strictly increasing in psj for all
values of psi. Thus the optimal pair of prices are p￿
si = p￿
sj = ￿.
To conclude: Result (i) is a direct consequence of step 5; result (ii) is step 3 for the optimal
license prices p￿
si = p￿
sj = ￿; and ￿nally result (iii) is step 4 for p￿
si = p￿
sj = ￿.
Proof of Lemma 2. Because we concentrate in SPE, the strategy for the inventor dictates,
at the beginning of each period ￿ ￿ t + 1; the price at which she o⁄ers a license to imitator
j : p￿
sj 2 R+ [ f+1g for every feasible history. On the other hand, the strategy for imitator
j orders for each period ￿ ￿ t + 1 and every feasible history whether ￿to enter￿ or not, and
conditional on entrance, his mode of entry.
Note that any SPE in pure strategies must satisfy the following two properties:
Property 1 (Copy never occurs): Imitator j enters the market by purchasing a license at a
price of ￿.
As in lemma 0, the innovator always prefers to o⁄er a license at a price psi = ￿ rather than
o⁄er no license: she can at least obtain licensing revenues. Furthermore, if a license is sold, it
will always be sold at a price of ￿. If not there would be a pro￿table deviation for the innovator.
Property 2 (No Delay): Imitator j immediately buys a license.
By property 1 we know that imitator j will never copy in equilibrium. Thus, when a license
is o⁄ered at period ￿ he can either accept the current o⁄er or reject it and then accept a future
license o⁄er. Rejecting a current o⁄er would be a best response if imitator j obtained a higher
payo⁄ by accepting a future o⁄er. However this is clearly impossible according to property 1.
Formally, the following pair of strategies form the unique SPE
psj = ￿ always
￿j =
(
￿enter￿by ‘ if psj ￿ ￿
￿enter￿by c if if psj > ￿
59See, for instance, Proposition C.1, page 302, Marshall and Olkin
33in which imitator j enters immediately at t + 1 by buying a licensing at a price equal to ￿.
Proof of Proposition 3. We consider all feasible subgames that start at the beginning of
period t at which neither imitator has entered the market yet. The inventor announces, at the
beginning of each period ￿ ￿ t, for each feasible history a pair of license prices
n
p￿
si;p￿
sj
o
. The
imitators, at each period ￿ ￿ t; and for each feasible history, simultaneously decide whether ￿to
enter￿or not and, conditional on entrance, how to enter. The proof is similar to that of lemma
2. We proceed in two steps.
Step 1. We observe that any SPE must satisfy the following three properties:
Property 1 (Copy never occurs): The imitators enter the market by purchasing a license.
The argument follows similar lines to those of the previous lemma.
Property 2 (Simultaneous Entry): The imitators enter the market at the same period.
To see this, suppose it were not. Then one of the imitators, say imitator i, must enter the
market at period ￿ ￿ t and imitator j at period b ￿ > ￿. By lemma 2, we know that in equilibrium
b ￿ = ￿ + 1 and the imitator j￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ in period ￿ units is ￿ (￿3 ￿ ￿). However, if
imitator j deviates and buys a license at period ￿ his worst payo⁄ would be ￿3 ￿ ￿ which is
strictly higher than ￿ (￿3 ￿ ￿). Thus, the conclusion follows.
Property 3 (No Delay): Whenever the innovator o⁄ers a license, her equilibrium o⁄er will
be simultaneously accepted by the imitators.
We know that copying will never take place and that entry will occur simultaneously. If the
imitators reject the current o⁄er and enter the market in a future period they will be strictly
worse o⁄ because at any period at which the licenses are traded their price will be equal to ￿.
Properties 1, 2 and 3 together imply that, for any history at which the imitators have not
entered the market yet, the licenses will be traded immediately. Then, the unique best response
for the innovator is to o⁄er at every period and for every feasible history the same pair of
equilibrium license prices,
n
p￿
si;p￿
sj
o
= f￿;￿g for all ￿ ￿ t + 1. Moreover, the following pair of
strategies conform the unique SPE
￿
p￿
si;p￿
sj
￿
= f￿;￿g always
￿h =
(
￿enter￿by ‘ if psh ￿ ￿
￿enter￿by c if if psh > ￿
So, in the unique SPE both imitators will enter at period t = 0 and the inventor￿ s discounted
equilibrium payo⁄ is ￿3 + 2￿.
Step 2. In the case of exclusive contracts the innovator￿ s discounted equilibrium payo⁄
is V e
s = ￿3 + 2￿; and in the case of non-exclusive contracts, according to proposition 2 is
Vs = ￿1
r+2￿ + 2￿
r+2￿ (￿3 + ￿). To compare them we de￿ne ￿ :=
h
￿1
r+2￿ + 2￿
r+2￿ (￿3 + ￿)
i
￿[￿3 + 2￿].
Our goal is to show ￿ ￿ 0. We have that ￿ ￿ 0 if and only if ￿1 ￿ ￿3 ￿ 2￿(r + ￿). Given that
￿ = r(￿3 ￿ ￿)=￿, it follows that ￿ ￿ 0 () ￿1￿3￿3 ￿ 0. This last inequality is always strictly
satis￿ed for all market games considered in this paper. Hence, we conclude that it is strictly
preferable for the innovator to o⁄er non-exclusive contracts.
Proof of Proposition 4. We show the validity of this proposition sequentially.
34Step 1. After the ￿rst imitator, say imitator i, enters the market at time t imitator j must
enter the market at some ￿nite time ￿ ￿ t.
To see this, suppose it were not. This is impossible because by copying at time t imitator j
guarantees himself a payo⁄ in time t units equal to Vj = ￿3 ￿ ￿ > 0.
Step 2. In any SPE entry must occur through licensing. Moreover, the price of the license
at any ￿ ￿ t at which entry happens must be equal to zero.
This follows the logic of previous proofs.
Step 3. For any d2 2
h
0; e d2
i
there exists a SPE whose outcome is for imitator j to enter the
market at time t2 = t + d2 by buying a license at a zero price i⁄ 2￿3 ￿ ￿2.
To prove this statement, note that the following strategies support the SPE outcome described
above.60 In particular, for the sellers (the inventor and imitator i)
￿s = ￿i =
(
pj = ￿ for all ￿￿ such that t ￿ ￿￿ < t2
pj = 0 for all ￿+ such that ￿+ ￿ t2
And for the buyer (imitator j)
￿j =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
￿enter￿by ‘ buying from b y if b p ￿ pj = ￿3(1 ￿ e￿r(t2￿tj)), for ￿￿ such that t ￿ ￿￿ < t2
￿wait￿ if b p > pj = ￿3(1 ￿ e￿r(￿￿tj)), for ￿￿ such that t ￿ ￿￿ < t2
￿enter￿by ‘ buying from b y if b p ￿ minf￿;(1 ￿ ￿)￿3g, for all ￿+ ￿ t2
￿enter￿by c if ￿ ￿ minfb p;(1 ￿ ￿)￿3g, for all ￿+ ￿ t2
￿wait￿or ￿do not enter￿ if minfb p;￿g > (1 ￿ ￿)￿3 for all ￿+ ￿ t2
where tj 2 [￿￿;t2) is the time at which one of the sellers o⁄ers a license to imitator j, b y denotes
the identity of the seller who o⁄ers the minimum license price and b p := miny2fi;sg pyj
Now we show that for any d2 2
h
0; e d2
i
these strategies form a SPE. First, note that by
de￿nition of e d2 imitator j does not have any incentive to deviate and choose ￿to enter￿by copying
at any time ￿￿ such that t ￿ ￿￿ < t2. Second, suppose that a license is o⁄ered at a price b p at
time tj 2 [￿￿;t2). If he accepted the o⁄er, he would obtain a payo⁄ in time tj units of ￿3 ￿ b p. If
he instead rejected it, he would receive a payo⁄ in time tj units of e￿r(t2￿tj)￿3. Thus, his best
response is to accept the o⁄er and enter the market i⁄ b p 2
￿
0;pj
￿
where pj = ￿3(1 ￿ e￿r(t2￿tj)).
Consider the strategy of the sellers and a time t2 = t + d2. For d2 = 0, the proof is done in
Lemma 0. Hence, let d2 be such that 0 < d2 ￿ e d2. Then a seller, say imitator i, might deviate
from the proposed strategy and o⁄er a license at time tj for tj 2 [￿￿;￿). From the buyer￿ s
strategy, the maximum price he can charge is pj. Imitator i will not ￿nd pro￿table to deviate at
time tj if ￿3 + pj ￿ ￿2
￿
1 ￿ e￿r(t2￿tj)￿
+ e￿r(t2￿tj)￿3. That is if 2￿3 ￿ ￿2. We have therefore
shown the ￿rst part of the proposition.
To show the uniqueness result of the second part of the proposition, suppose that 2￿3 > ￿2
and that a license is sold at time t2 > t. According to step 2, the equilibrium license price must
be zero. Besides we know that for any tj 2 [￿￿;t2) imitator j will accept to pay at most pj for
60The strategies should be interpreted as prescribing actions at nodes in the limiting case when ￿ ! 0
35a license. But because 2￿3 > ￿2 o⁄ering a license at a price pj is a pro￿table deviation for the
sellers. Because our argument is valid for any value of t2 > t it follows that the unique SPE,
when 2￿3 > ￿2, is the no-delay equilibrium.
Finally, note that the strategies of the sellers and of imitator j for all time periods ￿+ ￿ t2
are identical to the strategy used in the proof of Lemma 0. Hence, the proof is concluded.
Proof of Proposition 5. We denote by G(t) : [0;1) ! [0;1] the distribution function
of entry times for the imitators. We assume momentarily that G(t) has a density denoted by
g(t) and, to simplify, we also suppose that the innovator does not price discriminate between the
imitators. The proof is in a number of steps.
Step 1. Imitators may delay their entry into the market only if d2 2
h
0; b d2
￿
for b d2 =
(1=r)ln(￿2=￿2 ￿ ￿) < e d2.
To see this, note that V2 = V1 when ps = (1￿e￿rd2)￿2. Substituting b d2 in this last expression
yields ps = (1 ￿ e￿rb d2)￿2 = ￿. So, for all d2 2
h
0; b d2
￿
the inventor might choose a license price,
ps, that satis￿es (1￿e￿rd2)￿2 < ps ￿ ￿ and hence V2 > V1. Thus depending on ps delay to buy
the ￿rst license may occur.
Step 2. We obtain the distribution function of entry times assuming that V2 > V1.
To accomplish this, recall that because we focus on a behavior SPE equilibrium, at time t,
if entry has not happened yet, imitators must be indi⁄erent between: (i) Choosing ￿to enter￿
at time t; and (ii) Waiting dt extra units of time before entering. This indi⁄erence condition
requires that the opportunity cost of waiting dt units of extra time be exactly equal to the
expected marginal bene￿t of waiting dt units of extra time. The opportunity cost is the ￿ ow of
pro￿ts that an imitator would obtain if he were the leader imitator at t. That is MC = rV1dt.
The marginal bene￿t is the increase in the payo⁄ that an imitator receives by being the follower
rather than the leader imitator. That is MB(dt) = V2 ￿ V1. However, the marginal bene￿t is
only received if the rival imitator enters ￿rst: an event that is determined by the hazard rate
￿(t) ￿ (g(t)=1 ￿ G(t)). So, in a SPE it must be that ￿(t)(V2 ￿ V1) = rV1dt. Using equation (9)
of the main text we obtain that for a d2 2
h
0; b d2
￿
equilibrium entry times are characterized by
a constant hazard rate (and thus by an exponential distribution) given by
￿(ps) =
r
￿
(1 ￿ e￿rd2)￿2 + e￿rd2￿3 ￿ ps
￿
[ps ￿ (1 ￿ e￿rd2)￿2]
Step 3. We calculate the equilibrium expected payo⁄ for the inventor and show that p￿
s = ￿.
Like in the proof of proposition 2, assume that the time of the ￿rst entry occurred at t 2
[0;1). Since now the follower imitator enters the market with a delay equal to d2 (i.e., he
enters at time t2), the inventor obtains: (i) A ￿ ow of monopoly pro￿ts up to time t; (ii) At
time t, she receives the price for the license ps; (iii) A ￿ ow of duopoly pro￿ts from time t
up to time t2; and ￿nally: (iv) A ￿ ow of triopoly pro￿ts from time t2 on. Hence, her payo⁄
is Vs(t;ps;d2) = ￿1
r
￿
1 ￿ e￿rt￿
+ e￿rt ￿
p +
￿
1 ￿ e￿rd2￿
￿2 + e￿rd2￿3
￿
. But because the time of
the ￿rst entry t1 := minfti;tjg has an exponential distribution with parameter 2￿ it follows
36immediately that her expected payo⁄ is
Vs(p;d2) =
￿1
(r + 2￿)
+
2￿
(r + 2￿)
h
ps +
￿
1 ￿ e￿rd2
￿
￿2 + e￿rd2￿3
i
To conclude this step it su¢ ces to show that the optimal price chosen by the inventor is equal
to ￿. If that were the case, note that for all d￿ 2 [0;du
￿) : V2 > V1 and the assumption made in
step 2 would be satis￿ed. To accomplish this, observe that the innovator chooses a price, p, to
maximize Vs(p;d￿) subject to the hazard rate found in step 2. Thus
dVs(p;d2)
dps
= ￿
2r
[r + 2￿(ps)]
2
d￿
dps
(￿1 ￿ M) +
2￿
(r + 2￿)
where M :=
￿
p + ￿2 ￿ e￿rd2 (￿2 ￿ ￿3)
￿
. Since: (i) d￿=dps < 0; (ii) argminps2(0;￿](￿1￿M) = ￿;
and (iii) The least upper bound of ￿ is ￿3, it is evident that inf￿ (￿1 ￿ M) = ￿1 ￿ ￿3 + ￿2 +
e￿rd2 (￿2 ￿ ￿3) > 0. So, because dVs(￿;d2)=dps > 0 the inventor must indeed choose p￿
s = ￿
and her equilibrium payo⁄ is obtained by replacing p￿
s into Vs(p;d2).
Proof of Proposition 6. It is well-known (See, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole [1991])
that, for preemption games, the limiting distribution of discrete-time games (i.e., when ￿ goes
to zero) may not usually be expressed as an equilibrium in continuous time strategies of the kind
we have used in proposition 5. Because of this limitation, we use our discrete time model and
then we compute the limiting distribution of the equilibrium outcomes.
Step 1. We obtain for our discrete time model the unique symmetric SPE in behavior
strategies.61
The equilibrium condition is W ( ) =   [V2 ￿ Vb] + (1 ￿  )[￿Q( ) ￿ V1] = 0, for Q( ) =
 Vb + (1 ￿  )V1. This quadratic equation has two roots
  =
￿b ￿
p
b2 ￿ 4ac
2a
where a := ￿ (V1 ￿ Vb) > 0; b := (V2 ￿ ￿V1) + (1 ￿ ￿))(V1 ￿ Vb); and c := ￿(1 ￿ ￿)V1 < 0.
Because ￿ is a function of ￿, it follows that as ￿ goes to zero,   converges to ￿(V2 ￿ V1) ￿
(V2 ￿ V1)=[2(V1 ￿ Vb)]. Naturally, we consider the solution corresponding to the positive root
 ￿ = (V1 ￿ V2)=(V1 ￿ Vb). By de￿nition of V1;V2 according to equation (9) and given that
Vb = ￿3 ￿ p we have that
  =
￿
1 ￿ e￿rd2￿
￿2 ￿ ps
(1 ￿ e￿rd2)(￿2 ￿ ￿3)
Observe that   < 1 i⁄ V2 > Vb. But because we consider all those values for d￿ 2
h
b d2; e d2
i
, it
follows that V2 > Vb i⁄ ps satis￿es ￿(￿3=￿2) < ps ￿ ￿. Thus, at each period, each imitator
plans to enter the market independently with probability equal to   conditional on no having
entered before.
Step 2. Assuming that V2 > Vb, we establish the limiting distribution of entry times when
61Recall that the inventor sets the same price for both licenses.
37￿ goes to zero.
Fix any real time t > 0 and observe that the probability that no imitator will have entered
by time t is approximately equal to (1 ￿  ￿)n(t;￿) where n(t;￿) := (2t)=￿ is the number of
decision nodes between time 0 and time t when the real time length of a period is ￿. As ￿ goes
to zero, n(t;￿) increases without bound and hence this probability also converges to zero. The
conclusion is, therefore, that at least an imitator will enter the market for sure at time t = 0.
Next, we obtain the probability of simultaneous entry at time t = 0. For that, consider that we
must compute the probability of simultaneous entry conditional on the information that the event
in which no imitator enters the market has zero probability. Because both imitators entering
simultaneously has probability  2, it is direct to conclude that the probability of simultaneous
entry at time t = 0 is ￿(ps;d2) =  =(2 ￿  ) and therefore the inventor￿ s expected payo⁄ is
Vs(p;d2) = ￿(ps;d2)[2p + ￿3] + [1 ￿ ￿(ps;d2)]
h
p +
￿
1 ￿ e￿rd2
￿
￿2 + e￿rd2￿3
i
Step 3. The optimal price is p￿
s = ￿.
The proof follows similar lines to the preceding ones. Observe that
@Vs(p;d2)
@ps = (@￿=@ps)!(ps)+
(1 + ￿), where ! (ps;d2) :=
￿
ps ￿
￿
1 ￿ e￿rd2￿
(￿2 ￿ ￿3)
￿
. Then it is straightforward to show that
@￿
@ps
=
2
(2 ￿  )
2
@  (ps;d2)
@ps
=
2
(2 ￿  )
2
￿
￿
1
(￿2 ￿ ￿3)[1 ￿ e￿rd2]
￿
and that (1 + ￿) = 2=(2 ￿  ). Straightforward mathematical manipulations show that
@Vs(ps;d2)
@ps
> 0 () ￿
! (ps;d2)
(￿2 ￿ ￿3)[1 ￿ e￿rd2]
+ (2 ￿  ) > 0
And after replacing   and ￿ (ps;d￿) by their values, we ￿nally obtain
@Vs(ps;d2)
@ps
> 0 () 2
￿
1 ￿ e￿rd2
￿
(￿2 ￿ ￿3) ￿
￿
1 ￿ e￿rd2
￿
￿3 > 0
It is evident that because 2￿2 > 3￿3 : @Vs(ps;d2)=@ps > 0 for all ￿(￿3=￿2) < ps ￿ ￿ and the
optimal price is p￿
s = ￿ validating our assumption that V2 > Vb. The equilibrium payo⁄ for the
inventor is directly computed by replacing p￿
s in Vs(ps;d2).
Proof of Proposition 7. We assume that there are n potential imitators, that time is
continuous and, to simplify the exposition, we also suppose that the innovator does not price
discriminate between the imitators. The proof follows a number of steps.
Step 1. After the ￿rst entry, there is a perfect equilibrium in which n ￿ 1 licenses are sold
at a zero price to the remaining imitators.
The argument is exactly the same as that of Lemma 0 adapted to the case of n potential
imitators. This implies that the payo⁄, in period t units, for the leader and the follower imitator
are respectively V1 = ￿n+1 ￿ psn and V2 = ￿n+1.
38Step 2. A necessary condition for a perfect equilibrium in behavior strategy to exist is
W ( ) := W ￿ V1 = 0
where W := e￿r￿
n
(1 ￿  n)
n￿1 V1 +
h
1 ￿ (1 ￿  n)
n￿1
i
V2
o
.
To establish this, we ￿rst note that each imitator must be indi⁄erent between: (i) Entering
by buying a license at real time t; and: (ii) Entering by buying a license at real time t + ￿.
Conditional on no imitator having entered up to time t, if one of them enters immediately at
time t he will obtain a payo⁄ in time t units equal to
V1 = ￿n+1 ￿ psn
However, if he decides to enter at time t + ￿ he will obtain: (i) A payo⁄ equal to V2 if at least
one of the other n ￿ 1 imitators have entered in the interval of time ￿; and: (ii) A payo⁄ equal
to V1 if none of the other n ￿ 1 imitators have entered in the interval of time ￿. So by entering
at time t + ￿ he will obtain a payo⁄ in time t units equal to
W = e￿r￿
n
[1 ￿  n]
n￿1 V1 +
h
1 ￿ [1 ￿  n]
n￿1
i
V2
o
where  n is the probability for each imitator of entering in the interval of time ￿, conditional
on not having entered before real time t. That is
 n := Prft < th ￿ t + ￿jth > tg
In a perfect equilibrium it must be that W ( n) := W ￿ V1 = 0. Or equivalently that
W ( n) =
n
[1 ￿  n]
n￿1 ￿ er￿V1 +
h
1 ￿ [1 ￿  n]
n￿1
io
V2 = 0 (A4)
Step 3. Note that by the Binomial Theorem, [1 ￿  n]
n￿1 can be written as
[1 ￿  n]
n￿1 = 1 ￿ [n ￿ 1] n +
￿=n￿1 X
￿=2
￿
n ￿ 1
￿
￿
[￿ n]
￿
Step 4. The equilibrium distribution of entry times is exponential with hazard rate equal to
￿n =
r[￿n+1 ￿ psn]
[n ￿ 1]psn
To establish this, we ￿rst use the result of step 3 in equation (A4) to obtain
W ( n) = ￿(V2 ￿ V1)
￿=n￿1 X
￿=2
￿
n ￿ 1
￿
￿
[￿ n]
￿ + [n ￿ 1][V2 ￿ V1] n +
￿
1 ￿ er￿￿
V1 = 0
39Hence, as ￿ ! 0, W ( n) goes to
￿(V2 ￿ V1)
￿=n￿1 X
￿=2
￿
n ￿ 1
￿
￿
[￿ n]
￿ + [n ￿ 1][V2 ￿ V1] n = 0
and thus the unique solution for  n 2 [0;1] is  n = 0. By using L￿ Hopital￿ s rule and the implicit
function theorem, it can be shown that the following limit
￿n := lim
￿#0
 n(￿)
￿
is ￿nite and well de￿ned. For this reason, we can divided both sides of (A4) by ￿ and take the
limit of it when ￿ goes to zero
lim
￿#0
(
￿(V2 ￿ V1)
￿=n￿1 X
￿=2
￿
n ￿ 1
￿
￿￿
￿
 n
￿
￿￿
￿￿￿1 + [n ￿ 1][V2 ￿ V1]
 n
￿
+
￿
1 ￿ er￿￿
￿
V1
)
= 0
It is evident that the limit of the ￿rst terms goes to zero as ￿ goes to zero and lim￿#0
(1￿er￿)
￿ =
￿r. So
￿n =
rV1
[n ￿ 1][V2 ￿ V1]
=
r[￿n+1 ￿ psn]
[n ￿ 1]psn
Step 5. We show that p￿
sn = ￿n.
We follow the same steps of previous propositions (i.e. Propositions 2 and 5). Assume that the
time of the ￿rst entry occurred at real time t 2 [0;1). Since the follower imitators would enter
the market with a zero delay, the inventor would obtain: (i) A ￿ ow of monopoly pro￿ts up to time
t; (ii) At time t, she would receive the price for the license psn; and (iii) A ￿ ow of pro￿ts equal to
￿n+1 from time t on. Hence, her payo⁄ would be V n
s (t;psn) = ￿1
r
￿
1 ￿ e￿rt￿
+ e￿rt [psn + ￿n+1].
But because now the time of the ￿rst entry t1 := minfti;tj;:::tng has an exponential distribution
with parameter n￿n it follows that her expected payo⁄ is
V n
s (psn) =
￿1
[r + n￿n]
+
n￿n
[r + n￿n]
[psn + ￿n+1]
To conclude this step it su¢ ces to show that the optimal price chosen by the inventor is equal
to ￿n. To accomplish this, observe that the innovator chooses a price, psn, to maximize Vs(psn)
subject to the hazard rate found in the previous step. So
dV n
s (psn)
dpsn
=
@￿n
@psn
rn
(r + n￿n)
2 f￿￿1 + psn + ￿n+1g +
n￿n
(r + n￿n)
and since we have assumed that for all n 2 P : (￿n+1 ￿ ￿n) > 0 and psn ￿ ￿n, it follows that
suppsn [psn + ￿n+1 ￿ ￿1] < 2￿n+1 ￿ ￿1 < 0 for all n 2 P. Finally because @￿n=@psn < 0, it
ensues that dVs(psn)=dpsn > 0 for all psn 2 (0;￿n] and so p￿
sn = ￿n as stated.
Step 6. When n ! 1; V n
s (￿n) ! ￿1.
40To this end note that the innovator￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ is
V n
s (￿n) =
￿1
[r + n￿n]
+
n￿n
[r + n￿n]
[￿n + ￿n+1]; for ￿n =
nr[￿n+1 ￿ ￿n]
[n ￿ 1]￿n
So
lim
n!1
V n
s (￿n) = ￿1 lim
n!1
1
[r + n￿n]
+ lim
n!1
n￿n
[r + n￿n]
lim
n!1
[￿n + ￿n+1]
And
lim
n!1
(n￿n) = r lim
n!1
￿
n
n ￿ 1
￿
lim
n!1
￿
￿n+1
￿n
￿ 1
￿
= 0
Because: (i) limn!1
h
n
n￿1
i
is bounded; and (ii) By assumption 3: limn!1
h
￿n+1
￿n ￿ 1
i
= 0. Thus,
because limn!1 [￿n + ￿n+1] = 0, it follows directly that
lim
n!1
V n
s (￿n) = ￿1
and the proof is completed.
Proof of Proposition 8. Because we focus on MPE, the payo⁄relevant history is determined
by the number of imitators who are active in the market at each time period. Thus, the following
partition H := fHag, where Ha is a set that collects all those histories for which a 2 A =
f0;1;2:::g imitators are active in the market, is the coarsest su¢ cient partition that allows us
to de￿ne MPE. A strategy for the innovator, ￿s, is Markovian if it is measurable with respect
to the corresponding sets Ha. Formally, if the history b h￿ 2 Ha(e h￿) for some a 2 A then the
continuation strategy ￿sjb h￿ must equal the continuation strategy ￿sje h￿.
Measurability implies that the inventor￿ s strategy must prescribe the same list of prices
fpsng
1
a=0 2 R+ [ f+1g for each period ￿ ￿ t at which the same number of active imitators are
in the market.
Consider ￿rst the subgame following entry of at least one imitator. In particular let a be the
number of active imitators.
Step1: The unique symmetric markov perfect equilibrium is such that the innovator and all
a imitators o⁄er n ￿ a licenses at a zero price to all the remaining imitators.
First note that as in the case of the no-delay licensing equilibrium this is clearly a SPE. We
want to show however that it is the unique symmetric MPE.
As in previous proofs, we can show that entry necessarily occurs by licensing. If imitators
entered by copying there would be a pro￿table deviation for the active players.
Furthermore, when the license is sold it must be sold at a price of zero. Therefore, all licenses
are sold for a price of zero.
Step2: No imitator initially enters.
Given step 1, imitators know that if they are the ￿rst to enter, their pro￿ts after entry will
immediately be reduced to ￿n+1. Furthermore, if K > n, ￿n+1 < ￿. Therefore the ￿rst entrant
expects pro￿ts of V1 = (1 ￿ ￿)￿2 + ￿￿n+1 ￿ ￿. And as ￿ ! 1 and n ! 1: V1 ! ￿n+1 ￿ ￿ < 0.
Thus entry cannot be pro￿table and the innovator keeps monopoly rents forever.
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